1. Perm do the aff and the alt in all other instances – solves ressentiment and still lets us liberate the Tohono – all we need is to win 1% risk of solvency and you vote aff
2. Perm do both – Nietzsche’s philosophy is personal and not meant for large scales like nation-states. Since we are not actually suggesting that a policy be passed, we can both affirm our entire lives and discuss the implications of the USFG passing a certain plan.
Grayson Bodenheimer 14, Sociologist at Appalachian State University and has one published research paper in the areas of history and philosophy that were presented at the National Conference of Undergraduate Research, “’With All Winds Straight Ahead:’ The Influence of the World Wars on the Understanding of Friedrich Nietzsche” Appalachian State University http://www.ncurproceedings.org/ojs/index.php/NCUR2014/article/download/1094/538 BFH
Fueling the flame that grew into the philosophy that became known as Existentialism, Friedrich Nietzsche¶ introduced into the world a new form of thought outside of the realm of logic and reason. However, unlike his ¶ Existentialist predecessor Søren Kierkegaard, Nietzsche did not believe that Christian values should define human¶ existence. Instead, Nietzsche focused on man himself and his own individual will. One of the first times that¶ Nietzsche’s ideas captured the international spotlight was during World War I – though not in the way that he would¶ have hoped for. The chaos and destruction of World War I in 1914 presented America with a view of Germans as¶ immoral and power-hungry, and a depiction of Nietzsche as “the apostle of German ruthlessness and barbarism.”1¶ In¶ Germany itself, however, the growing nationalistic and anti-Semitic crowds found inspiration from his works, taking¶ many of his most radical ideas to heart. These two interpretations of Nietzsche’s works are remarkably similar, yet¶ they yield completely different applications of his philosophy. Germany’s National Socialists, commonly known as¶ the Nazis, used Nietzsche’s most radical ideas to justify their views on war, the extermination of non-Aryan peoples,¶ and the conquest of Europe and, eventually, the world. The Americans did not believe that Nietzsche could justify¶ the Nazis' behavior, but they perceived him as an inspiration and his works as a foundation of Nazi ideology.¶ Although some would argue that Nietzsche's belief in perspectivism could bolster the claim that either of these¶ interpretations might be viable, neither the Nazi Germans nor the Americans were correct. Nietzsche’s philosophy is¶ not applicable on a large scale, such as that of the nation-state; rather, it is a personal philosophy, which no¶ government can dictate. This leads both interpretations to be incorrect; while Nietzsche’s works were used as a¶ justification of Nazi behavior and likely even a foundation for early Nazism, this understanding of his work is an¶ invalid misconception, purposefully misconstrued by Nazis and Americans as propaganda to be used for their own¶ philosophies.
3. Case is a DA to the alt and a net benefit to the perm—in any sense this K is an impact turn to the aff, the aff is an impact turn to this K. Even if ethics aren’t GENERALLY good, they don’t have evidence saying the right to cross a border is bad—the alternative can never result in that – it’s a DA, plain and simple.
4. No link – their args assume we attempt to solve all suffering, which doesn’t assume survival strategies, which view small acts as significant – we don’t believe in panaceas
5. No link – dealing with injustices doesn’t cause ressentiment
Bickford, 97 (Susan. "Anti-Anti-Identity Politics: Feminism, Democracy, and the Complexities of Citizenship." Hypatia 12.4 (1997): 111-31. Web. 2 Aug. 2015.)//TB
Anger, as Lorde theorizes it, is very different from Nietzschean ressentiment. Anger is indeed reactive; it is a response to injustices, like racism. It is a specific kind of reaction, though; Lorde distinguishes anger from hatred, the latter being marked by a craving for the destruction and elimination of others. By contrast, “anger is a grief of distortions between peers, and its object is change” (1984, 129). Unlike ressentiment, then, anger's reactive character does not “reiterate impotence” or constrain the ability to act.16 Anger is energy directed toward another in an attempt to create a relationship between subjects that is not “distorted” (made unjust) by hierarchies of power and the way subjects work within those hierarchies. If those hierarchies are to be changed through political interaction, then recreating the relationship between subjects is a central step. To recognize anger as a possible force in that reconstruction is to recognize the specificity of the creatures who engage with one another; it neither requires us to deny ourselves nor prevents our connecting with others. But materializing the possibility of relation and change that anger carries with it depends both on our own actions and on the responses of others. The uses of anger require creativity, as Lorde makes clear in characterizing the “symphony of anger”: “And I say symphony rather than cacophonybecause we have had to learn to orchestrate those furies so that they do not tear us apart. We have had to learn to move through them and use them for strength and force and insight within our daily lives” (1984,129). But we also have to learn how to hear anger, how not to treat it as destructive, offputting, guilt-inducing. As Lorde points out, it is not the anger of Black women that is corroding the world we live in (1984, 133). It is not the anger of other women that will destroy us but our refusals to stand still, to listen to its rhythms, to learn within it…. The angers between women will not kill us if we can articulate them with precision, if we listen to the content of what is said with at least as much intensity as we defend ourselves against the manner of saying. (1984, 130-31) The political uses of anger require creative action on both sides: articulating with precision, listening with intensity. We are responsible, then, for how we speak and how we hear each other. Lorde's analysis of anger provides a possible way of rethinking “resentment.” But it is important to recognize that the public passion of anger is not always or automatically used in the service of democratic or progressive aims. The anger and hatred behind “ethnic cleansing” or militant militias reveals in the most disturbing way how this all-too-human emotion can lead to the deepest inhumanity. Anger can indeed tear citizens apart, and lead them to tear others apart. There is no one meaning inherent in the political expression of feeling, whether anger or suffering. The question would seem to be not how to rid politics of anger, but whether and how we can create conditions in which anger is put to the service of a just world. This is relevant to the contemporary leftist abhorrence of claims of “victimhood” and suffering. As long as some people are oppressed, claims about suffering are relevant in public discourse. Let me suggest an alternative way of hearing these claims. A claim of victimhood is not automatically an assertion of powerlessness or innocence; it is an assertion about the exercise of unjust power. It is a protest against certain relations of power and an assertion of alternative ones, for to speak against the exercise of unjust power-to speak against being victimized—is to say that I am a peer, a rightful participant in the argument about the just and the unjust, in the collective exercise of power. Claims about suffering, as well as claims made in anger, can be attempts to enact democratic political relationships. Both are part of the languages of citizenship. What I am suggesting is that this conception of democratic citizenship requires, as part of its conditions for realization, a practice of political listening. Such listening is best understood not as an attempt to get at an “authentic” meaning, but as participation in the construction of meaning. And I think we democratic theorists need to begin to imagine supple institutional spaces that might support such interaction and foster and sustain coalition politics.17 Enacting these relationships, speaking and listening to these languages of citizenship, is not particularly easy. If anger is “loaded with information and energy” (Lorde 1984, 127), we may justifiably fear its intensity and the intensity of our own response. Hence the necessity for courage, which has been connected to citizenship for centuries of political thought, although usually in ways that emphasized virility and battle strength. I have argued elsewhere (Bickford 1996) that Anzaldua, Lorde, and others point to the necessity for a feminist reworking of courage and give us the resources to begin that transfiguration.18 Fearlessness, as Lorde says, is a luxury we do not have, and need not wait for. We can learn to work and speak when we are afraid in the same way we have learned to work and speak when we are tired. For we have been socialized to respect fear more than our own needs for language and definition, and while we wait in silence for the final luxury of fearlessness, the weight ofthat silence will choke us. (1984, 44) An ethic of courage is thus an ethic oriented toward political action, not psychological pain. Yet it takes seriously the psychological state, for that is what necessitates the exercise of courage. Implicit in this understanding of courage is the recognition that we “can sit down and weep, and still be counted as warriors” (Rich 1986, 25); the articulation of suffering is not incompatible with the daring exercise of citizenship. Such courage—the courage to act, to take responsibility for the world and ourselves, despite risk—is a necessary quality for radical democratic politics and theory in a context of difference and inequality.19 As citizens, we need to foster the courage necessary to take the risks of political action. But we also need to learn to recognize its exercise. This involves reconceptualizing political identity as active, and thus reinterpreting identity claims. Suffering and citizenship are not antithetical; they are only made so in a context in which others hear claims of oppression solely as assertions of powerlessness. A conception of citizenship adequate to the world in which we live must recognize both the infuriating reality of oppression, and the continual exercise of courage with which citizens meet that oppression. It must recognize, in other words, that claims of inequality and oppression are articulated by political actors. As Lorde says—and I end, in tribute, with her words—“I am not only a casualty, I am also a warrior” (1984, 41).
6. Nietzsche hated indigenous people – he justified the colonization by saying Aryans are the superior race.
Santaniello, 94 (Weaver. Nietzsche, God, and the Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth. Albany: State U of New York, 1994. 105-06. Print.)//TB
When contrasting slave and noble morality in the first essay, Nietzsche traces the origin of the word good to the self-identification of the warrior-aris- tocracy. He describes this aristocracy as the Aryans, who were the conquerors of inferior indigenous people of Europe, as well as elsewhere ("One may be quite justified in continuing to fear the blond beast at the core Of all noble In contrast, the inferior indigenous people who were conquered by this race are characterized by coloring, a shortness of skull, "perhaps even in the intellectual and social instinct. The Greek noble class, the "rich," the "pos- sessors" (which is the meaning of arya) applied to themselves the term good (warriors) and also defined themselves in terms of character traits, regarding themselves as the true (esrhlos). Greece exemplifies the noble-aristocracy. Judea became the exemplar of the priestly-slave nation after its conquest by other empires, and Christianity inherits this work of Judea in constructing a morality Of revenge against the conquerors. Originally, Nietzsche holds, good and bad were terms for different social classes.
7. Ressentiment good – solves democracy and multiculturalism. Their alt fails to resolve the K.
Coulthard, 7 (Glen S. "Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the ‘Politics of Recognition’ in Canada." Contemp Polit Theory Contemporary Political Theory 6.4 (2007): 437-60. Web. 2 Aug. 2015. .)//TB
Ressentiment is not jealous: It is not necessary to maintain consistency of political message across time and context. Ressentiment can be cultivated via the assignment of blame to political enemies while simultaneous speaking of a politics of reconciliation, bipartisanship, and aisle-crossing. Ronald Reagan coupled an insouciant optimism and personal charm with deft demonization of evil empires, welfare queens, and their fellow travelers. Left politicians misunderstand the Rightist criticism of “flip-flopping” because they take the critic to literally mean what he or she says. The Rightists do not mean this, and they know it. The flip-flopping of one’s political allies is as meaningless as the flip- flopping of one’s foes is evidence of hypocrisy, weakness, indecisiveness, etc. Thus one sees plenty of politicians who play to opposite registers (resentment now, reconciliation later) and who are not punished; the ones who are, like John Kerry, are punished not for 25 flip-flopping but for being too dull-witted to understand the nature of the game they are playing. Ressentiment should be cultivated at the most general level possible, though without ruling out the use of specifics: Personalized narratives of woe are crucial to the refinement of ressentiment, but this should not be taken as license to “go specific” at all costs. In particular, examples of particular people should be used carefully, as the most important element of the exemplar is that a general audience be able to their own story mirrored in the spectacle of misery being displayed before them. While there are numerous possible foci for such a generalized ressentiment, the corporation and the government agencies beholden to corporate capitalism still seems the most likely and most fruitful targets of opportunity. It is crucial, however, to maintain the rhetoric of equality of opportunity and the defense of the small businessman amidst the critique of the corporation. If this seems like an impossible feat, consider that it is no more inherently difficult than Reagan’s rhetorical evisceration of “Big Government” while simultaneously creating the creating the largest American federal government in history. Of course there was a contradiction at the heart of his program – but does identifying this as a debating point have any real effect? Ressentiment is inevitable as long as consumer capitalism holds sway, according to the theorists most prized by the Left, so we had better make our peace with her: This is not to reify ressentiment, as I have stated before, but it is to say that the Left more so than the Right has reason to utilize ressentiment with a good conscience. It is from the Left that 26 we hear the narrative of capitalism as a ressentiment-producing engine of amazing power (Connolly 1988; Brown 1993), and unless capitalism is about to pass from the scene, which seems wishful thinking of the most extreme nature, the Left should be harnessing the energy of this current rather than simply criticizing it. There are many filaments that comprise the fiber of the American Left, but whether indebted to the theories of Marx, Nietzsche, or Rawls, most of these strands implicitly link their political programs to the ressentiment-producing apparatuses of contemporary society. Indeed, Wendy Brown implies that ressentiment is responsible for “welfare-state liberalism” as such in the form of “attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the ‘disadvantaged’” (Brown 1993, 400). Perhaps I am being unfair here to Brown, but it sounds as if the welfare state is a rather tawdry achievement. While I have no interest in further propping up the status quo, it seems worth noting that ressentiment’s acknowledged role in the creation of liberal democracy, here scoffed at by Brown, is no small thing. Ressentiment is patient, but not infinitely so. If, as Melissa Lane observes in her study of Plato’s Statesman, a sense of timing is the sine qua non of the political ruler (Lane 1998), then we must be sensitive to the kairos, the right moment for the deployment of a ressentiment-filled rhetoric. It would be difficult to imagine a more opportune moment than the present recession for cultivating a sense of working-class victimage, yet, oddly enough, it is the Right rather than the Left which has been carrying the banner of anti- finance capital. How is this possible? When one is the party in power in the United States it is difficult to govern without the consent of the barons of Wall Street, and the 27 Democrats must be particularly solicitous of the favor of the financial elites since a collapsing Dow Jones, ever skittish of “statist” Democratic interference, is prone to regard even the mildest brand of Democratic populism as the equivalent of the October Revolution. Democratic elites have felt it necessary to go the extra mile around a horse as shy as this one, and coupled with the particular friendships and connections between Obama and his economic advisors, who read like a who’s who of Goldman Sachs alums, and it is easy to understand why it is Glenn Beck rather than Barack Obama who has taken up the populist mantle. That said, opportunities like this do not come along often, and pivotal electoral moments can reshape the political landscape for decades. The crucial question to ask is how the needs of the resentful many can be squared with the need to placate corporate power (i.e. to prevent stock markets from crashing, capital fleeing overseas, international economic sanctions, etc.). Populists from South America to Europe have found multiple answers to this question, so the dilemma is not an insoluble one. But in order to address this tension the Left must first give up its utopian hope that the Beloved Community is around the corner, and that all that is needed to get there is one final psychological purge. The resentful are going to be here for a long time to come, as Brown and Connolly ably demonstrate, so Obama, Pelosi, Reid, and their successors must begin to think more creatively about how to combine the politics of hope with the politics of blame. After Ressentiment In closing I would suggest that my praise of ressentiment is also in line with the more deliberatively conceived multiculturalism of the Left than is the current puritanical disdain. As Monique Deveaux argues, it is a failure of political imagination when we 28 fixate on liberal principles as preconditions to multicultural dialogue, and in particular it is necessary to move toward a deeper level of intercultural respect rather than mere toleration (Deveaux 2000).10 But if it is appropriate to go beyond simply tolerating non- liberal peoples abroad and in immigrant communities, if we must go beyond toleration to do justice to the rich tradition of cultural pluralism, then perhaps we can also open our hearts and minds to the possibility that the ressentiment-suffused need to be heard out as well. Perhaps rather than demonizing ressentiment as a toxin to politics, as the worst of the worst for subjects whom we purport to free, we must accept that ressentiment is for many inseparable from their conception of their own freedom. Perhaps rather than pitying these poor fools, in ways that we would never pity a plural wife in the global South, we should ponder whether ressentiment as a precondition of subjectivity is as much a gift as a curse. And are we so sure, after all, we late Nietzscheans, that our crusade against ressentiment is not itself suffused with ressentiment? Is not itself fully in the grips of it? How would we know if it were or weren’t? Perhaps we are, in our own way, as spiteful, vain, petty, weak, subjected, enraged against the past, capitalized, consumerized, unfree, as those we purport to want to free from the chains of slave morality. Perhaps it is ourselves that we need to give a break to, that we need to get over, when we first look to purge the other of ressentiment. Perhaps we all swim in this current, perhaps we are all Ressentiment’s children, and perhaps that is OK – even to the extreme of the using ressentiment unconsciously in the effort to rid the world of ressentiment. Though just in saying so I wouldn’t expect that to do much to overturn Ressentiment’s reign. No, she is far too puissant for that. But we do not need to rage against the weakness in others because we fear the dependence and weakness in ourselves. As Vetlesen puts it, defending Amery: “Against Nietzsche, who despised victims because he saw them as weak, as losers in life’s struggles, Amery upholds the dignity of having been forced by circumstances beyond one’s control into that position, thus reminding Nietzsche that as humans we are essentially relational beings, dependent, not self-sufficient. In hailing the strong and despising the weak, in denying that vulnerability is a basic ineluctably given human condition, a condition from which not only the role of victim springs but that of the morally responsible agent too, Nietzsche fails to be the provocateur he loves to believe he is: He sides with the complacent majority and so helps reinforce the existential and moral loneliness felt by Amery, the individual victim who speaks up precisely in that capacity” (Vetlesen 2006, 43). Perhaps we can begin to see how we have been using the weak, the viewers of Glenn Beck and others, as the targets for our need to find blameworthy agents. And that too is fine. The trouble comes when we think we’ve gone beyond Ressentiment when in fact we’re just listening to her whisperings without realizing it. We think that we can well and truly look down on the Rush Limbaughs, these destroyers of civilization, because they are possessed by something that we are above. And far be it from me to suggest that we should not resent, should not blame; I merely suggest we direct our blame toward more useful ends than where it is currently located.
8. Any chance of solvency means you vote affirmative. If we can resolve the impacts of the case, there’s no ressentiment.