Inedit pun on unpblished (fernch meaning) and false cognate with English, undited.
Derrida’s work as uneditedd.
Poe does not trnaslate the French and Latin quotations
Heidegger did not want the Gerek translaetd in transaltions of his German publications.
Crptography Cyr;t Shell and the Kenrle Nietzsche’s columbarium (Spurs)
Last Intrview “last times” Fichus, 168
The book that wil never have been written, Fichus instead a TV guiide of its contents
Critical edition of Poe versus of Derrida.
Leave behind versus abndon purning and melancholia a protocol
Co called late Derrida
Tense—was literary present would answer ( (conditional) will have been (future anterior) and ould have been (future anterior conditional)
Last word after the last word (first word before the first)
Posthumous veruss the “to come”, the future, the archive as about the future. Customs and customs agents 27-28
IF I WERE ONE DAY T WRITE THE BOOK I DREAM OF FICHUS, 177
The seven chapters of the the this history I dream of are already being written I’m sure. . . But we don’t yet know how and on hwat medium those who mst forgive me for not mentioning them other than in a summary note. 17 Note 17 203-04.
Before hastening to my conclusion Fichus 173
Genetic criticism and the archive (Cixcous, Geneses, Genenealogies, Genres, and Genius: The Secrets of the Archive) “Genetic criticism comes to a dead end here. P. 27 dreams / translations versus published words, p. 27 “A huge and daunting task fr centuries of readers to come. 28
Internal rereding—auto-biorpahical, as in prface to Husserl Geneis book versus Beast and the Sovereign Question. Cf also FIcuchs iagining read the future as illegible.
Leaving behind, the gift, legacy, debt, inheritance, under the rubric of a will, amortization or amorguization –amortize—dead hand
Internal citations and prefatory rellopings, like rereading legacy in the Envois as well as mentioned facteur in the envois. In To Specualte on Frued, Note on Freud and Scene of writing, note 3, 347; mention in text on p. 407
ANythign in Fichus about hwo Derrida will be read after he’s dead?
Derrida Post Card notes
Going Postal: Err-Responsibility
The sentence follows from the previous one , also the last of the previous section
Beyond all conceptual oppositions Bemächtigen indeed situates one of the exchangers between the drive to dominate as the drive of the drive, and the “will to power.” 405
The third recourse is like the third ring he mention, the chapter the third of three seminars, the first two of which he does not publish.
Nietzsche’s name is not mentioned” 26) like Derrida says Freud does not mention Socrates name.
“limping devil” 269
limping p. 406
Cites Freud and scene of writing, n 6, 262 and also in the body of the text, 407.
“to be continued” 337 and 409
Top of 293, the last sentence of the long quotation of a preface that is a note:
“Other fragments of the same seminar will appear soon in book form.” 293
This has encouraged me to publish this fragment here. 292
Here is the description, and I will interrupt my translation at moments. 307
Trains and spool 314-15 locomotive 316
La séance continue 320
I now translate the attempt at another interpretation 326
La séance continue 329
Note on Freud and Scene of writing, note 3, 347; mention in text on p. 407
Totally uninebriated 354
Auto-teleguiding 356auto-tely 359
6. Donner—le temps (To Give—time, in preparation, to appear later. 359
la séance continue 376
these are the last words of the chapter. . . This is the final point, the last words of the chapter. 385
Other essays (to appear) analyze this figure under the heading of “double chiasmatic inagination of the borders.” 391
The X about which one does not know what it is before banded, precisely, and represented by representatives. 393
8. An Allusion, in the seminar Life death, to other seminars organized, or three years running, under the title of La Chose (The Thng) (Heidegger / Ponge, Heidegger / blanchot, Heidegger / Freud), at Yale and in Paris. Perhaps they will give rise to other publications later. 401.
In this graphics desire is without “without,” is a without without without.9
9 A Cf. Pas and Le Paeregon in La Verities en peinture. [The phrase here is “un sans snas sans.]
Freud does not literally say 407
Certainly this translation is fauty by omission 289
My answer would be that—mod. First time, then repated part of it 378
Quotation punctured with ellipses lifted out the book 371
Drive of the drive 356
2. Fred and the Scene of Writing,” in Writing and Difference. 346
will become archival 342
And, once more, I will recall the scene made by Freud in Nietzsche’s memory. 263 I have cited it elsewhere 263
I will attempt the beginning of this book then, will attempt to draw it toward me for the third ring? But is it a ring? 260
Beyond the Pleasure Principle: I will propose a selective, filtrating, discriminating reading. 261
As if it had an incipit, I am, then, opening this book. It was our agreement that I begin it at the moment of the third ring1. 259
1, 259 The text on whose borders this discourse would be attempting to maintain itself is Freud’s BPP in volume 18 of the Standard edition; all references by page number in the text by page number]. In effect, I am extracting this material from a seminar which followed the itinerary of the three rings. Proceeding each time from an explication of a given text of Nietzsche’s, the seminar was first concerned with a “modern” problematic of biology, genetics, epistemology, or the history of the life sciences (readings of Jacob, Canguilheim, et.c,).Second ring: return to Nietzsche, and then an explanation of the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche. Then, here, the third and last ring.
To Be Published Footnote 10, p. 403”10. The problematic of the Ly a” (es gibt, There is) was engaged in another semnar (Donner—le temps), fragments of which are to be published.
Nietzsche introduces the three metamorphoses in his book Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The metamorphoses describe the process of spiritual transformation that characterizes his vision of the flourishing life. We don’t always think of Nietzsche as a “spiritual” philosopher. But the story of the three metamorphoses is nothing if not a saga of spiritual transformation. The phases of spiritual metamorphosis are symbolically represented by the camel, the lion, and the child.
Bio-Politics ö ü ß ä
Peter Szendy (Listen: A History of Our Ears Charlotte Mandell (Translator), Jean-Luc Nancy (Foreword)
Fort:Da, Can’t You See I’m Burning? “The time has not come for me either. Some men are born posthumously. . . .; perhaps there will be endowed chairs dedicated to Zarathrustra interpretation.” Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, in The Anti-Christ,Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols: And Other Writings Ed. Aaron Ridle Trans Judith Norman (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 100.
Repeats the repetition of repetition 301
the spectrality of the ‘material’ support takes the book’s future from the opposition of life and death that orients biopolitics to the way a text lives on, or ‘survives’, to use Derrida’s word: ‘Survivance in the sense of survival that is neither life nor death pure and simple, a sense that is not thinkable on the basis of the opposition between life and death’.
Derrida, TheBeast and the Sovereign 2, op cit., pp130-31. Derrida also links the ‘book’ and ‘bios’ through the phantasm in TheBeast and Sovereign 2, op. cit., p129-133, p148-49.
In Robinson Crusoe, Robinson Crusoe himself, both the Robinson Crusoe who speaks and the one keeping a journal, all that they—there are already a lot of them-might have desired is that the book, and in it the journal, outlive them: that might outlive Defoe, and the character called Robinson Crusoe. . . . Now this survival, thanks to which the book bearing its title has come down to us, has been read and will be read, interpreted, taught, saved, translated, reprinted, illustrated, filmed, kept alive by millions of inheritors—this survival is indeed that of the living dead. (130)
The book lives its beautiful death. That’s also finitude, the chance and the threat of finitude, this alliance of the living and the dead. I shall say that this finitude is survivance. Survivance is, in a sense of survival that is neither life nor death pure and simple, a sense that is not thinkable on the basis of the opposition between life and death. (130)
Like every trace, a book, the survivance of a book, from its first moment, is a living-dead machine, sur-viving, the body of a thing buried in a library, in cellars, urns, drowned in the worldwide waves of the Web, etc., but a dead thing that resuscitates each time a breath of living reading, each time the breath of the other or the other breath, each time an intentionality intends it and makes it live again by animating it, like . . . a body, a spiritual corporeality, a body proper (Leib and not Körper), a body proper animated, activated, traversed, shot through with intentional spirituality. (131)
in the procedural organization of death as survivance, as treatment, by the family and / or the State, of the so-called dead boy, what we call a corpse.,. . . not just in the universal structure of survivance . . . but in the funeral itself, in the organized manner, in the juridical apparatus and the set of technical procedures whereby we . .deliver the corpse over to its future, prepare the future of a corpse and prepare ourselves as one says prepares a corpse. . . . this fantasmatics of dying alive or dying dead (132)
Jacques Derrida, “Preface to the 1990 Edition” inThe Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy trans. Marian Hobson University of Chicago Press, 2003, xiii-iv.
Was it necessary to publish this writing dating from 1953-54? In truth I must say that even today, though it is over and done with, I am not sure. . . .
In rereading this work, along with the worries, the reservations, even the objections which multiplied in me, along with the bouts of ill-ease that I felt then, I was most disturbed by the listening to myself, in the experience that consists of hardly hearing myself, with difficulty, as on tape or screen, and of recognizing without recognizing, I mean without accepting, within even tolerating, through the memory of shifts in philosophy, in rhetoric, in strategy, in a way of speaking, hardly changed perhaps, an ancient and almost fatal position of a voice, or rather a tone. This tone can no longer be disassociated from a gesture that is uncontrollable even in self-control: it is like a movement of the body, in the end always the same, to let itself into the landscape of a problem, however speculative it may seem. And yes, all that seems like an old roll of film, the film is almost silent, above all one can hear the noise of the machine, one picks out old and familiar silhouettes. One can no longer listen to oneself at such a distance, or rather, if one can, on the other hand alas, begin to hear a bit better, it is also because one has the most trouble in doing it: pain in front of a screen, allergy at the authoritarian presence of an image of oneself, in sound and in sight, about which one says to oneself in the end, perhaps, one never liked it, nor really known it hardly run across it. That was me, that is me, that?
I had not reread this student essay for more than thirty years. The idea of publishing it had never crossed my mind.
“If so, it may be asked why I have embarked upon efforts such as those consigned to this chapter, and why they are delivered for publication. Well—I cannot deny that some of the analogies, correlations, and connections which it contains seemed to me to deserve consideration” (60; mod.). Period, the end. This is the final point, the last words of the chapter. The Post Card, 385.
The ellipsis of memory 373
Give myself tonight 372
Peter Szendy, Listen: A History of Our Ears Trans Charlotte Mandell; Foreword, Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008)
Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles/ Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche. Trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1981)
Talk to the Hand Ring Tones of Philosophy
Dial Tones and Tin Ears
Beyond the Pleasure Principle: I will propose a selective, filtrating, discriminating reading. 261
But a certain reading of his text, which I am attempting here, cannot fail to come across its work, 277
The very surface of the “overlap” 283
But the “hypothesis” with which I read his text and several others 285
No Weg withoutt Umweg 284
What is given s first filtered, selected, actively dilmited. This discrimination is in part declared at the border. 299
I would like to attempt a partial and naïve reading 298
Writing affects the very surface of its support. And this nonbelonging unleashes speculation 283
Here I m asking quesitons in the dark. Or in a penumbra, rather, the penumbra in which we keep ourselves when Frued’s unanalyzed reaches out its phospherescenet attanae. 278
He writes himself, he sends himself. 282
Is this not a free zone . . 281 IS there a duty (resosnsbility, tax holiday, travel) fre zone? Nthing to declar at the border to custms?
Here it seems to me, we must pay the greatest attention to Freud’s rhetoric. And by the same token, to the scene, the gestures, the movements, the filtrating strategy, the busy selectivity. 279
As concernsreferrng Being and Time to The Genealogy of Morals in the question of Schuldigsein—I will attempt it elsewhere. 264
Note. Derrida translates “Schuld” in this note, but not the latter word, nmeaning being guilty”
I will attempt the beginning of this bok then, will attempt to draw it toward me for the third ring. But is it a ring? 260
This is what would impose a limit on the translation. 268
Nietzscvhe’s name is not mentioned, but small matter. The expersison “perpetual recurrence of the same thing” appears , between quotation marks, in the third chapter.
“Seblstdarstellung” not translated on p. 265; 272 meaning self-staging
This first chapter will have been contorted in its brevity” 279
I am going right to the end of this chapter, toward the site of our first pause whww . . . 278
These questions are not asked by Freud, not here, and not in these terms. 281
In sum, Freud could have stopped there (and in a certain way he does, I think that everything is played out in these first pages, in other words that everything wil nly repeatt his arrest, his pas de marche, but it is repetiiton, recisely, that is in quesiton here.) 283
This Freud does not say, does nto say it presently, here, nor even elsewhere in this form. 285
How does death await at the end, at all the ends (the three interlaced ends that only make up one divided end) of this strucutre at every step of this peculation? 285
Life death 285
Until now, but we have only just begun 287
This is the conclusion of the chapter. We have not advanced one step 296
InitallyIremakr this: this is the first time in this book that
Family vactioncy 300
But can also be read, according to the supplemntary necessity of a parergon, as an autobiogrphy of Freud. Not simply an autobiography confiding his life this own more or less testamentary writing, buta more or less living description of his own writing, of his way of writing what he writes, most notably Beyond . . . . The autobiography of the writing posits and deposits simultaneously 303
I have attemtpted to eplain myself on this question elsewhere. 304
The notion of the repeition “en abyme”of Freud’s writing has a structural mimesis with the reation between the PP and its death drive. The latter, once again, s not opposed opposed to the former, but hollows it out with a testamentary writing, “en abyme” orginally, at the origin of the origin. 304
I myself will not oepen this curtain—I leave this to you--… 308
I am not syaing the grandfather’s intervention 310
I am not commenting on what Freud says, I am not syaing that Freud is saying:” 31`0
There is nothing hypotehtical or audacious about sayng this; it is an analytical reading of what Freud’s text says explcitly. 312
A call for a footnote that I will read presently. 313
This how we fall on the first of the two footnotes. 318
Telephonic or tellescripted 319
Let us make a pause after this first footnote 320
Detour of the tele 320
But nothing has been said yet 321
I have just said: “Already at the moment when the scene, if this can be said, took place.” And I add a fortiori at the moment of desiring to write about it, or of sending oneself a letter about it, sothat the letter makes its return after having instituted its postal relay , which is the very thing that makes it possible for a letter not to arrive at its destination, and that makes this possibility-of-never-arriving divide the strucutre of the letter from the outset Because (for example) there would be neither postal relay nor analytc movement if the place of the letter were not divisible and it a letter always arrived at its destination. I am adding a a fortiori, but let it be understood that the a fortiori was presribed in the supplementary graphics of the overlapped taking place of twhat too hastily would be called the primary scene. 324
The a fortiori of the a priori makes itslef ( a bit more) legible in the second note of which I spoke above. It was written afterward, and recalls that Sophie is dead: the daughter (rmother) recakked by the child died soon after. . . . It follows the first note only by a page, but in the inenterval a page as been turned. 324
This is the sentence htat calls for a ntoe on Sophie’s death 325
Calls for a note 326\
Call for a ntoe on Sophie’s death 326
For us, hter is no question of accrediitng such an empirico-biographical connection between the “speculation” of Beyond . . . and the death of Sophie. No quesiton of accrediitng even the hypothesis of sychthis conneciton. 328
La séance continue. This is ltierally, and in French in the text, what he writes . . . “ 329
Third “overlapping” caracterisitc 330
In 1923, the first operation on the mouth. 333
An overlap wthout equivalaence: fort:da. 321 (“fort / da” up through p. 320)
The formal strucutre yields itself to reading 31
(More than ten years ago in its very last lines, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” gave a step of Freud’s to be continued. This—coming back as a deferred supplement---is to be continued.) p. 337, last sentences of “Freud’s Legacy”
And assign it to an auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic scene of writing This scene of writing does not recount something, the content of an event that would becalled the fort:da. This remains unrepresentable, but produces, then producing itself, the scene of writing. 336
I am suposing t reread 339
Transference operates as a resistance, 339
It is the strucutre of the PP as overlapping . . 342
The last free-will in person (the signer of the will) no longer has naything to do with it or with anyone. You cary his name. 345
Why have I called this place of defeat for the master a front? 345
Froom this point on .. Freud’s discourse becomes more and more obscure an ellipitcal. 347
Amortize them small doses, 347
Freud calls these “emtaphors” Vorbilder, models, prototpyrs, paradims. He believes htem necessary in order to support metapsychology. . . . 349
Their overlap 351
Dead silence about death. It has not yet been mentioned. Almost half the book. 353
Here Freud is not afraid of being reproached for the profond,” i.e. “mystical” allure of this meditation.
Addrssor and addressee of the news, teleguiding its (his) legacy, autoteleguiding it, . . If , auto-teleguiding its (his) legacy . . . 356
One genetic model 364
Strucutre and Geneis—Derrida’s book on Husserl
Tumor mouth 365
The best assay of the rings, links, alliances, etc. 367
Genetic information 366
He drops the matter, like the ntoe at the bottom of the page which puncuates the end of this act” 368
Morever he has puncutred with ellipses after lifting it out of the body of the text, Freud seems barely attenttive 371
The origin is a speculation 370
Stories in which other stories are told 371
Each one makes himself nto the facteru, the postman, of a narrative that he transmits by maintaining what is “essential” in it: underlined, cut out, translated, commented, edited, taught, reset in a chosen perspective. 373
Frued omits the scene of the text . . If Freud erases Socrates . . 374
But it is not over. La seance continue 376
He does not say that he is convinced, but he does not say the opposite, he does not say that he does not believe htem. 378
In these last two cases, or steps, the transition from observation to theory would onlyhave been a translation (Uberstzung) , and Freud seems to mean by this that a translation does not unbalance equivlaances. . . . the translation (Uberstzung) might comport an exaggeration, an overestimation (Uberschatzung) of the “significance: of the facts and mateiral sof observation. From whence would this overestimating translation come, this transgression in translation? 380
Everything is due to the difficulty of properly naming the thing itself 382
All thse trajectories—transitonal, transcriptoive, transposiitonal and transgresive, trasferntial trajectories—open the very field of speculaiton 382
All these metaphors regroup htemselves around notions of repeition, of analogy, of cprrecespondence in view of a destination, of relay, of reedition or corrected and revised edition, transcription, translation from an “original.” 384
This is the end: an appendix that is as reduced as possible . . . One more fort:da for nothing 387
HoLIDAY: Nothing perhaps, f nto a seventh chapter, at the end of an exhasuting week, our “Sunay”—or, if you prefer, Saturday—chaoter. 386
Irereoslutoin nd insolvency 388
And Freud was beginning to know, or at least to foresee what it meant to speak form the mouth of a prosteheis at the mouth. I am not only thinking thinking of the cigars . . . 388
What is it to resolve a problem? 390
Limps 391 “Thus it limps and is hard to close. 291
And taking into acocunt the supplementary relays that I have just recalled, to post:to band. Postal:binding. 394
The step or the trans- always alread have the form of the return. 397
Erloschen (extinction) 398
Irresolution belongs to this impossible logic. 401
Bemachitgung: the word and the concept have never been center-stage. 403
The allusion to limping, in the alst line of the book 406
“Freud and the Scene of Writing, 407
One can still compare, translate, transfer, traffic sort [trier]. 408
“. . . Mephisotpheles. WHose name is curiosuly omited form the French translation which only gives the reference to Faust 1. But the results sought after are only those of a “sober” “certainty” that is totally uniebriated. 354
Obviously it is in the place of the thing X that the “Vorbilder,” the images, the models, the prototypes, and the paradignms, form whatever filed they come, try themselves out. But it suffices that there be a field and a force for the medivcla and military codes to bre close to carrying the day, And do theyaways do via a code, the rehtoric ofa code, the code of the code, in other words an impliict theory of tele-information, of the message, the msisve, the emissary, the mission of the emission, of the envoi, and the postal network. 349
I recognize this in this an an exemplary movment of what was elsewhere named paralysis.
Note 48 “Pas” in Gramma 3-4, 1975 [reprinted in Parages, Paris: Galilee, 1986). 336
Very softly, in a strange note aded afterward. 306
The excuse itself has left an archive wihtin grammar 307
I am taking up my account exactly at the point at which I left off without skipping anything. 306
we have an apparently autobiogrphical, that is domesitc pieece. 298
Textual performance . . textual process”261
Who wil have speculated? 265
Freud’s disease (cancer of the jaw The connection appears to be an empircally external one . . . If we wish, in another style, with other questions, to interlace the networks of a so-called “inernal” reading with those of the auobiography, the auography, te autothanaography, and those of the “analtic movement,” to the extent that they are inseparable, then we must begin, at least, by pointing out in the hastily named “internal” reading the places that are strcutrally open to intersecting with the other networks. What appeared elsewhere concerning the parergonal supplement implies not only the possibility, but also the necessityof the intersecting, along with all the paradoxes with the motifs of the frame, the border, the title, and the signature then becomes engaged. 273
Which I open to the first page 273
Small footnote to the letter to d’Almbert 270
Nietzsche Dawn 264 Nietzche 265
And without blinking, a footnote refers in the Editions Sociales, without even specifiying, as the Academy would have it, “tr. Sl. Mod.” 268
No more htan to Nietzsche . . No more than to Nietzsche” 266
This concerns bios in its autobiographical register . . . As for bios in its biological or biologistic register. . . A certain writing will make its bed in them. 273
That he hoped for this survival of psychoanalysis is probable, but in his name, survival on the condition of his name: by virtue of which he says that he survives it as the proper place of the name. 334
(Here, I interrupt this development. If one is willing to read its consequences, including its appendix in Le facteur de la verite, one will perceive, perhaps, a contribution to th a decrypting still to come of the French analytic movement.) 335
But because me and myself, as you are no doubt aware, we are going to die, my relation –and yours too—to the event of this text, which otherwise never quite makes it, our relation is that of a structurally posthumous necessity. And it is hardly necessary to know that this text is undecipherable for it to remain, at once and for all, open, tendered and undecipherable. 137
The death that I am talking about is not that of tragedy nor that attributed to a subject. One would have to make a case for a subject and draw its consequences for that scene where we are occupied. But the procedure is not such that “I am mortal, therefore, etc. . . “. On the contrary, only when such a scene is possible can death and the posthumous be anticipated,. Thus, as far as tragedy and parody go, the same holds true for birth. 139
Relation between the postal and the posthumous
Call for a footnote that I will read presently. 313 Footnotes, 268; 270-72; 303; 313; 319-20; 324-26
Shortly before his death, Derrida told an interviewer,
I am among those few people who have constantly drawn attention to this: you must (and you must do it well) put philosophers’ biographies back in the picture, and the commitments, particularly political commitments, that they sign in their own names, whether in relation to Heidegger or equally to Hegel, Freud, Nietzsche, Sartre, or Blanchot, and so on.
“Controversy over the Possibility of a Science of Philosophy”
La Decision Philosophique No. 5, April 1988, pp. 62-76.