81 [M141]. I have used ‘Concept’ for Miller’s ‘Notion’ as a translation of Hegel’s ‘Begriff’, but continue his practice of capitalizing it, to distinguish it from empirical or determinate concepts such as red and mass.
83 This is not (as it might appear) a shift in concern from the objective side of truth (in the presystematic representational terms native to Verstand, of what is sout there, to be representeds) to the subjective side of certainty (of our srepresentings, in heres). The topic is still what is known empirically, the objects of understanding and thought. Rather, we are to follow out some of the consequences of them being understandable, thinkable—that is, inferentially (and only inferentially) accessible—objects. Hegel does not here make a move that it is natural for us to consider at this point: distinguishing between sense and reference. Theoretical thoughts and claims (in the sense of the content that is thought or claimed) may well be essentially inferentially articulated, so identifiable and distinguishable only holistically, as part of a whole system of such things. But, we want to say, it by no means follows that the objects of our thoughts and claims, what we are thinking and talking about, are correspondingly essentially, and not merely contingently, related to one another. Senses might be holistic (“internally related” to each other, as the nineteenth century British idealists said) without this precluding an atomistic understanding of their referents. Understanding Hegel’s conception of the relation between Vernunft and Verstand requires keeping this deep and important issue in mind. Hegel has not at this point put on the table the conceptual resources needed for his reconstruction of the relation between what is represented and the contents of representings of it—what one needs to be entitled to appeal to a sense/reference distinction in this way. When he does, his notions will work somewhat differently. It would be premature at this point to convict Hegel of a confusion, before we see where he is going.
Notice that it is not obviously an obligatory consequence of distinguishing between, on the one hand, the concepts hammer and nail, and hammers and nails on the other, that one conclude that while the concept mutually presuppose and involve one another, the actual hammers and nails do not stand in any corresponding relationships. Of course, these chunks of wood and metal do not, but the hammers and nails that occupy the same spatio-temporal regions may require thinking about somewhat differently. [Promissory Note: Must return to this point in INTROREP.]
84Logic [ref.][go to Cambridge version], p. 117, §36.
85 Quoted phrase is also from §36. The distinction between the intension and the extension (Inhalt and Umfang) of a concept is at §8 (p. 102) ff..
86 §43 p. 120.
87 Or the chains of syllogisms (definable entirely in terms of the identity of the concepts they involve, that constitute what Kant calls “rationcinatio polysyllogistica.” cf. §86,7.
88 “What stands under the condition of a rule stands also under the rule itself. [Note: The syllogism premises a general rule and a subsumption under its condition. One thereby cognizes the conclusion a priori not by itself but as conained in the general and as necessary under a certain condition.]” §57 of the Doctrine of Elements (p. 125).
89 “The identity of concepts in analytic judgments can be either explicit [ausdrückliche] (explicita) or non-explicit [nicht-ausdrückliche] (implicita). In the former case analytic propositions are tautological. Note 1. Tautological propositions are virtualiter empty or void of consequences, for they are of no avail or use. Such is, for example, the tautological proposition Man is man. For if I know nothing else of man than that he is man, I know nothing else of him at all. Implicitly [implicite] identical propositions, on the contrary, are not void of consequences or fruitless, for they clarify the predicate which lay undeveloped [unentwickelt] (implicite) in the concept of the subject through development [Entwickelung] (explicatio).” [§37; p. 118] [I think this doctrine of Kant’s (and this way of expressing it) is of the utmost importance, not only for Hegel, but also for Frege. But that is a story for another occasion entirely.]
97 Both phrases from [M142].
99 One wants to object to such a usage that both ends of even an asymmetric explanatory relationship can be realities: the presence of water vapor in the carburetor may explain the failure of my car to start. One is no less real than the other, even though one may be more observable. We will see below (in the discussion of the ontological status of the supersensible world) that Hegel is very much aware of this sort of case, and is concerned to make room for it in his scheme, even though the way he uses ‘real’ differently.
101 cf. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" §§39-44. See also the commentary at pp. 163-166 of the Study Guide [Harvard University Press, 1997].
103 [M159]. In Hegel’s telling of the story, this lesson is entwined with the lesson concerning the distinction between inferential relations and inferential processes, in which the first inverted world (which is the second supersensible world) is a way station.
104 See for instance [M155-6].
111 This is the language of the passage from [M159] quoted in the previous section.
113 I take it that there are historical reasons involving Schelling for considering this particular constellation. But such considerations are irrelevant to the sort of enterprise of rational reconstruction I am engaged in here.