1. We meet
A. A significant amount of CBP resources are devoted to surveillance
Miller 12 (11-1-2012, Todd Miller has researched and written about U.S.-Mexican border issues for more than 10 years. He has worked on both sides of the border for BorderLinks in Tucson, Arizona, and Witness for Peace in Oaxaca, Mexico. He now writes on border and immigration issues for NACL, "Ground Zero: The Tohono O'odham Nation," https://nacla.org/blog/2012/11/2/ground-zero-tohono-oodham-nation TB)
In human terms, this is where the long-term strategy behind the Border Patrol’s “prevention through deterrence” regime leads. After all, in recent years, it has militarized vast swaths of the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border. Along it, there are now 12,000 implanted motion sensors and 651 miles of walls or other barriers. Far more than $100 billion has been spent on this project since 9/11. The majority of these resources are focused on urban areas where people without papers traditionally crossed. Now, border crossers tend to avoid such high concentrations of surveillance and the patrolling agents that go with it. They skirt those areas on foot, ending up in desolate, dangerous, mountainous places like this one on the sparsely populated Tohono O’odham reservation, an area the size of Connecticut. The Border Patrol’s intense armed surveillance regime is meant to push people into places so remote and potentially deadly that they will decide not to cross the border at all.
B. Extend Miller 12 – The CBP surveills the Tohono with surveillance trucks and watch towers.
C. Extend CBP no date, everything the CBP does is surveillance or a direct result of surveillance
2. Counter Interpretation - All agree surveillance is watching over to exert power or control
Huey 9 (Laura Huey, prof of sociology, University of Western Ontario, 2009 Surveillance: Power, Problems, and Politics, Sean P. Hier and Josh Greenberg, eds p 221-2)
Among the various definitions and understandings of surveillance, there nevertheless remains common terrain. In the simplest sense – the act of watching over – surveillance encompasses activities that may be socially desirable. We might refer to the image of the nurse who keeps close watch over the ailing patient (Martin 1993) or even the police detective who watches the suspect in order to gather evidence or to prevent the commission of a crime (Marx 1988). In its more complex forms, the term carries nasty connotations (Martin 1993) – hence the frequent use of the mataphors of Orwell's Big Brother or Bentham's panopticon. Whether viewed as beneficial to society or detrimental to individual privacy, surveillance is about power and its manifestation in the world. The nurse who systematically collects the patient's vital signs uses this information to make decisions concerning the patient's well-being – a benevolent exercise of power. In contrast, the systematic collection of data on particular ethnic groups to target their members for increased observation by law enforcement can only be understood as power negatively manifested. I want to be explicit on this point: however a person is situated in relation to the exercise of power, understanding surveillance as the expression of power is necessary for understanding the politics of surveillance and, in particular, the beliefs and values of those who oppose its use and spread.
3. Prefer our interpretation – it’s the only one that includes critical affs on the topic: Foucault/bioptix, TSA trans, policing the colored line, etc.
Limits: Prefer breadth, we gain more topic education about large social issues in the status quo, like Islamophobia, natives, and also policy options that are materially important
Reasonability: Competing interps lead to a race to bottom, prefer reasonability
Predictability: Ours is a core aff, it’s on the wiki, this is one you should be prepared for.
Ground: Generics solve any lost ground
Fairness: Potential abuse isn’t a voter, make them prove they have suffered in this round
Education: Best for education, we learn about more issues while still keeping it adequately limited.
Extend 1ac miller 12 – Tohono are constantly surveilled. That’s the word used. The Tohono never know when they are being surveilled, i.e. when the CBP drone is right above their head.
1. Turn – the USFG uses the excuse of terrorism to oppress native populations and force nationalism against us.
Rivas, 6(Ofelia, Tohono born and activist fighting for cultural freedom, Immigration, Imperialism and Cultural Genocide: An interview with O’odham Activist Ofelia Rivas concerning the effects of a proposed wall on the US / Mexico border, The Solidarity Project, interviewed by Jeff Hendrix, http://www.tiamatpublications.com/docs/imperialism_interview_article.pdf, Accessed 7/15/15) CH
Imperialism – lately this word has been re-entering debate and speech around the country. For the most part, these days, the word imperialism is being used to describe the actions of the United States government as it seeks to gain control over Middle Eastern governments and economies. The continuing occupation of Iraq by the United States is the best example of this neo-imperialism. But imperialism is not limited to lands across the oceans, and the United States government is currently engaged in the occupation of lands much closer to home. We must never forget that the very lands claimed by the government of the United States in North America are claimed by nothing other than the right of conquest. The United States government is a government of occupation here in North America and the lands that it continues to claim and occupy are in spirit still the autonomous territories of the indigenous tribes that existed here before the first European colonists stepped foot on the continent. Since 9/11 the United States government has ratcheted up its attacks against the indigenous residents of the United States. In southern Arizona, these attacks have come in the guise of borderland defense. The traditional O’odham residents of southern Arizona have become the victims of a joint program carried out by the Department of Homeland Security and the Border Patrol to build a border wall across the entire 330 mile U.S / Mexico border, a 65 mile section of which will run along the southern edge of the Tohono O’odham reservation. This wall, if it is allowed to be built, will effectively cut in half the traditional territory of the O’odham and serve to disrupt traditional migration patterns and isolate O’odham villages that exist on opposite sides of the international border. To justify the building of this wall the government has once again used the fear of terrorism, as has become common since 9/11, to advance its fascistic imperialist interests. In a Time Magazine article dated September 20, 2004, entitled “Who left the door open” one can find a perfect example of the fear mongering about “terrorist threats” being used by the corporate media and government to justify the militarization of the border zone and the building of a border wall. Although the Time article does not specifically mention the proposed wall, it does mention the Tohono O’odham nation as being a specific weak spot in the border defense. The article states that “Law enforcement authorities believe the mass movement of illegals, wherever they are from, offers the perfect cover for terrorists seeking to enter the U.S…” Even the 9/11 commission chimes in on this absurd talking point in its report stating that: “two systemic weaknesses came together in our border system's inability to contribute to an effective defense against the 9/11 attacks: a lack of well-developed counter terrorism measures as a part of border security and an immigration system not able to deliver on 1 its basic commitments, much less support counter terrorism. These weaknesses have been reduced but are far from being overcome.” This last statement is especially ridiculous considering that none of the accused 9/11 hijackers crossed into the United States through its border with Mexico. Despite such evident absurdity, the government obviously feels that it can count on the ignorance and apathy of the American public to give it free reign as it moves to completely seal the border between the United States and Mexico. In fact, it seems that a small minority of deluded and frightened residents of this country have fallen for the government campaign of terrorist fear mongering and economic scapegoating of immigrants. The visible rise of racist vigilante groups such as the Minute Man project and Save our State are part of the very dangerous right wing consolidation of power taking place here in North America. It is essential for every resident of this land who does not agree with the racist nationalism being forced upon us in this country to rise up and stop this tide of fear based fascism before it is consolidated. Hundreds of thousands of migrants from the south have risen in a nationwide movement to resist this new wave of racism and fascistic demagoguery – now it is essential that the rest of us join them to resist the militarization of the U.S./Mexico border. It should go without saying that given the current trajectory of the Bush regime, a sealed border should be of grave concern to anyone living in North America – don’t forget that a sealed border can serve to keep people in just as well as it can serve to keep others out!
4. short ev indicates loss of culture should be prioritized over loss of life. Culture is a social fabric that allows the dead to be kept alive. Without culture all impx are terminally NUq. Means case definitely o/w the da
5. katz ev indicates border patrol’s discriminatory practices dehumanize and cause every form of evil – means case o/w
6. There is a low likelihood of terrorists crossing through the border and virtually zero chance of them launching attacks on US soil.
Steller, 14 (Tim. "Steller: Cross-border Terrorism Isn't the Realistic Threat." Arizona Daily Star. N.p., 9 Sept. 2014. Web. 17 July 2015. .)TB
As each new terrorist threat arises — Hamas, al-Qaida, al-Shabab — the alarm is raised again. Now it’s Islamic State’s turn: Texas Gov. Rick Perry and others have worried aloud that members of Islamic State have already crossed the U.S.-Mexico border or are preparing an attack from Mexico’s border region. “Islamic terrorist groups are operating in the Mexican border city of Ciudad Juarez and planning to attack the United States with car bombs or other vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices,” the group Judicial Watch reported Aug. 29, citing “high-level” sources. The alarm quickly spread, especially with tomorrow’s anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks approaching. It’s possible, of course, for such an attack to occur, but as with so many such perceived threats, it’s unlikely. To the extent that border problems pose a realistic threat to someplace like Tucson and Southern Arizona, it’s much more likely to be realized in an incident like the outrageous attack that occurred four days after the Judicial Watch piece was published. That day, a 16-year-old Tucson boy was kidnapped and held for ransom before being rescued by Tucson police the next day. Of the five people arrested so far (a sixth is on the loose), three were previously deported from the United States but managed to find their way back here. If you want to worry about the Mexican border, that’s the wiser place to focus your fear, not on Middle East terrorist groups. It’s not just me saying this. Listen to people like Tony Coulson, who retired in 2010 after crucial, post-9/11 years as head of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Tucson office. “Our vulnerability to terrorist activity has nothing to do with the border,” Coulson told me Tuesday. A smuggling organization that brings in a terrorist would be causing itself tremendous, unnecessary risk, he said. Still, the attraction of combining fears of the border and of terrorism is clear. A significant number of people who try to cross the border illegally from Mexico make it across, even now. Therefore, foreign terrorists who want to hurt the United States could try to get smuggled across to achieve their aims. The concern goes back, at least, to 1986. An Arizona Daily Star story that year said Cochise County Attorney Alan Polley told a U.S. Senate subcommittee that local officials needed help preventing cross-border terrorism. An FBI official told the same panel there was no significant threat of terrorism at the border. What happened in the intervening decades? Essentially, nothing. A few people have crossed the Mexican border, legally or illegally, and worked here to help fund Hamas or other terrorist groups abroad. None has crossed illegally and launched terrorist attacks here.
7. Border already porous now – link NUq
8. The vast majority of terror attacks in the US are from people legally in the nation. There’s no reason to fear a terrorist crossing the border.
McCombs and Steller, 11 (Brady and Tim. Contributors to the Arizona Daily Star. "Border Seen as Unlikely Terrorist Crossing Point." Arizona Daily Star. 07 June 2011. Web. 26 July 2015.
Over the last two decades, almost all of the known international terrorists arrested in the United States have come on legal visas or were allowed to come in without a visa, said Alden, of the Council on Foreign Relations. "These are people that come on airplanes," said Alden, author of "The Closing of the American Border," which explains how the U.S. revised visa and border policies in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The 19 people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks entered the country on legal visas. And over the last four to five years, the terrorist plots have increasingly involved people already in the United States - citizens and legal residents, he said. "The notion of the (Southwest) border as the line that protects us from terrorism has really gone out of the window in the last several years," Alden said. Not only is the U.S. side of the border heavily guarded, but the Mexican government makes an extraordinary effort to prevent terrorists from coming through its country. For instance, Mexico shares real-time information with the U.S. about airline passengers arriving in Mexico to make sure they don't include potential terrorists, Alden said.
9. Border Patrol catches less than half of crossers – link NUq
York, 13 (Byron. Byron York is an American columnist for the Washington Examiner, Fox News contributor, and author who lives in Washington, D.C. "What Is the Real Number of Illegal Border Crossings?" Human Events. 29 May 2013. Web. 26 July 2015. No, they can’t. To find some of the answers that Homeland Security won’t provide, the authors looked to other data — interviews with people who have tried to cross the border illegally; analysis of people who have been caught attempting to cross multiple times; and what is called “known flow,” that is, the actual observations by the Border Patrol of people trying to cross into the United States. Putting together all the evidence, what they found is that U.S. authorities are catching somewhere between 40 percent and 55 percent of the people who try to cross the border illegally. That’s more than in the past, when the Border Patrol had less manpower, but it’s still just somewhere around half, or even less.
No impact – their ev ignores the vast bioterror preparedness infrastructure already in place in the US.
Inglesby, 14 (Tom. Thomas V. Inglesby, MD, is the director and chief executive officer of the UPMC Center for Health Security. "Bioterrorism: Assessing the Threat." UPMC Center for Health Security. 11 Feb. 2014. Web. 26 July 2015. .)TB
In the last 10 years, progress in preparedness has been made in a number of areas. There are now a cadre of government officials, public health experts, doctors, nurses and scientists who have become knowledgeable and skilled in thinking through and planning for biological terrorism. That community of experts in and out of government didn't exist in 2001. There are also a series of major biopreparedness programs across the US government, some of which I will cite here. HHS/ASPR has funded hospital preparedness programs around the country and runs valuable programs like the National Disaster Medical System. NIH has a basic research program for biodefense. BARDA has developed a number of medications and vaccines that could be critical in future bio responses. CDC has funded state and local public health agencies to prepare for bioterrorism (among other crises and disasters), and it oversees laboratory research in this area, manages a strategic national stockpile of medications for use in an emergency, and has an Emergency Operations Center that is a model for other health agencies around the world. DHS has created a risk assessment and threat characterization process to help guide planning. FDA has created an office that deals explicitly with the regulation and approval of products to be used only in the event of bioterrorism, pandemics, or other urgencies or emergencies. The DOD and DOS have important programs dedicated to addressing the issue overseas through science and technology as well as cooperative threat reduction. Taken together, these efforts, combined with the substantial hard work of state and local public health agencies, hospitals, emergency management, and civic organizations, have put the country on a better footing in its ability to respond to major biothreats.
No impact to bioterrorism—attack won’t happen because no resources
Burton and Stewart 08 (Fred, Scott, 7/30/08, Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Busting the Anthrax Myth,” Fred is the VP of Stratfor, former deputy chief of counterterrorism at the Diplomatic Security Service, former counterterrorism agent with the US State Department, Scott is the VP of tactical analysis at Stratfor, former special agent with the US State Department involve din terrorism investigations, lead State Department investigator assigned to investigate 9/11, https://www.stratfor.com/node/154114, 7/16/15, SM)
We must admit to being among those who do not perceive the threat of bioterrorism to be as significant as that posed by a nuclear strike. To be fair, it must be noted that we also do not see strikes using chemical or radiological weapons rising to the threshold of a true weapon of mass destruction either. The successful destonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city would be far more devastating than any of these other forms of attack.∂ In fact, based on the past history of nonstate actors conducting attacks using biological weapons, we remain skeptical that a nonstate actor could conduct a biological weapons strike capable of creating as many casualties as a large strike using conventional explosives — such as the October 2002 Bali bombings that resulted in 202 deaths or the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191.∂ We do not disagree with Runge's statements that actors such as al Qaeda have demonstrated an interest in biological weapons. There is ample evidence that al Qaeda has a rudimentary biological weapons capability. However, there is a huge chasm of capability that separates intent and a rudimentary biological weapons program from a biological weapons program that is capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people.∂ Misconceptions About Biological Weapons∂ There are many misconceptions involving biological weapons. The three most common are that they are easy to obtain, that they are easy to deploy effectively, and that, when used, they always cause massive casualties.∂ While it is certainly true that there are many different types of actors who can easily gain access to rudimentary biological agents, there are far fewer actors who can actually isolate virulent strains of the agents, weaponize them and then effectively employ these agents in a manner that will realistically pose a significant threat of causing mass casualties. While organisms such as anthrax are present in the environment and are not difficult to obtain, more highly virulent strains of these tend to be far more difficult to locate, isolate and replicate. Such efforts require highly skilled individuals and sophisticated laboratory equipment.∂ Even incredibly deadly biological substances such as ricin and botulinum toxin are difficult to use in mass attacks. This difficulty arises when one attempts to take a rudimentary biological substance and then convert it into a weaponized form — a form that is potent enough to be deadly and yet readily dispersed. Even if this weaponization hurdle can be overcome, once developed, the weaponized agent must then be integrated with a weapons system that can effectively take large quantities of the agent and evenly distribute it in lethal doses to the intended targets.∂ During the past several decades in the era of modern terrorism, biological weapons have been used very infrequently and with very little success. This fact alone serves to highlight the gap between the biological warfare misconceptions and reality. Militant groups desperately want to kill people and are constantly seeking new innovations that will allow them to kill larger numbers of people. Certainly if biological weapons were as easily obtained, as easily weaponized and as effective at producing mass casualties as commonly portrayed, militant groups would have used them far more frequently than they have.∂ Militant groups are generally adaptive and responsive to failure. If something works, they will use it. If it does not, they will seek more effective means of achieving their deadly goals. A good example of this was the rise and fall of the use of chlorine in militant attacks in Iraq.∂ Anthrax∂ As noted by Runge, the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis is readily available in nature and can be deadly if inhaled, if ingested or if it comes into contact with a person's skin. What constitutes a deadly dose of inhalation anthrax has not been precisely quantified, but is estimated to be somewhere between 8,000 and 50,000 spores. One gram of weaponized anthrax, such as that contained in the letters mailed to U.S. Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy in October 2001, can contain up to one trillion spores — enough to cause somewhere between 20 and 100 million deaths. The letters mailed to Daschle and Leahy reportedly contained about one gram each for a total estimated quantity of two grams of anthrax spores: enough to have theoretically killed between 40 and 200 million people. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the current population of the United States is 304.7 million. In a worst-case scenario, the letters mailed to Daschle and Leahy theoretically contained enough anthrax spores to kill nearly two-thirds of the U.S. population.∂ Yet, in spite of their incredibly deadly potential, those letters (along with an estimated five other anthrax letters mailed in a prior wave to media outlets such as the New York Post and the major television networks) killed only five people; another 22 victims were infected by the spores but recovered after receiving medical treatment. This difference between the theoretical number of fatal victims — hundreds of millions — and the actual number of victims — five — highlights the challenges in effectively distributing even a highly virulent and weaponized strain of an organism to a large number of potential victims.∂ To summarize: obtaining a biological agent is fairly simple. Isolating a virulent strain and then weaponizing that strain is somewhat more difficult. But the key to biological warfare — effectively distributing a weaponized agent to the intended target — is the really difficult part of the process. Anyone planning a biological attack against a large target such as a city needs to be concerned about a host of factors such as dilution, wind velocity and direction, particle size and weight, the susceptibility of the disease to ultraviolet light, heat, dryness or even rain. Small-scale localized attacks such as the 2001 anthrax letters or the 1984 salmonella attack undertaken by the Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh cult are far easier to commit.∂ It is also important to remember that anthrax is not some sort of untreatable super disease. While anthrax does form hardy spores that can remain inert for a period of time, the disease is not easily transmitted from person to person, and therefore is unlikely to create an epidemic outside of the area targeted by the attack. Anthrax infections can be treated by the use of readily available antibiotics. The spores' incubation period also permits time for early treatment if the attack is noticed.∂ The deadliest known anthrax incident in recent years occurred in 1979 when an accidental release of aerosolized spores from a Soviet biological weapons facility in Sverdlovsk affected some 94 people — reportedly killing 68 of them. This facility was one of dozens of laboratories that were part of the Soviet Union's massive and well-funded biological weapons program, one that employed thousands of the country's brightest scientists. In fact, it was the largest biological weapons program in history.∂ Perhaps the largest attempt by a nonstate actor to cause mass casualties using anthrax was the series of attacks conducted in 1993 by the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo.∂ In the late 1980s, Aum's team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-of-the-art biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even tried to acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Its first attempts at unleashing mega-death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April 1990, the group used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the National Diet of Japan, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport in Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of toxin released, there were no mass casualties, and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the attacks had taken place.∂ When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aum's scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their biological weapons facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax; between June and August of 1993, the group sprayed thousands of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time, Aum not only employed its fleet of sprayer trucks but also used aerosol sprayers mounted on the roof of their headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, the attacks produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the group's successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had occurred.∂ Biological Weapons Production∂ Aum Shinrikyo's team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. They were able to travel the world in search of deadly organisms and even received technical advice from former Soviet scientists. The team worked in large, modern laboratory facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. They were able to operate these facilities inside industrial parks and openly order the large quantities of laboratory equipment they required. Yet, in spite of the millions of dollars the group spent on its biological weapons program — and the lack of any meaningful interference from the Japanese government — Aum still experienced problems in creating virulent biological agents and also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively.∂ Today, al Qaeda finds itself operating in a very different environment than that experienced by Aum Shinrikyo in 1993. At that time, nobody was looking for Aum or its biological and chemical weapons program. By contrast, since the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States and its allies have actively pursued al Qaeda leaders and sought to dismantle and defang the organization. The United States and its allies have focused a considerable amount of resources in tracking and disassembling al Qaeda's chemical and biological warfare efforts. The al Qaeda network has had millions of dollars of its assets seized in a number of countries, and it no longer has the safe haven of Afghanistan from which to operate. The chemical and biological facilities the group established in the 1990s in Afghanistan — such as the Deronta training camp, where cyanide and other toxins were used to kill dogs, and a crude anthrax production facility in Kandahar — have been found and destroyed by U.S. troops.∂ Operating in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border, al Qaeda cannot easily build large modern factories capable of producing large quantities of agents or toxins. Such fixed facilities are expensive and consume a lot of resources. Even if al Qaeda had the spare capacity to invest in such facilities, the fixed nature of them means that they could be compromised and quickly destroyed by the United States.∂ If al Qaeda could somehow create and hide a fixed biological weapons facility in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas or North-West Frontier Province, it would still face the daunting task of transporting large quantities of biological agents from the Pakistani badlands to targets in the United States or Europe. Al Qaeda operatives certainly can create and transport small quantities of these compounds, but not enough to wreak the kind of massive damage it desires.∂ Al Qaeda's lead chemical and biological weapons expert, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, also known as Abu Khabab al-Masri, was reportedly killed on July 28, 2008, by a U.S. missile strike on his home in Pakistan. Al-Sayid, who had a $5 million dollar bounty on his head, was initially reported to have been one of those killed in the January 2006 strike in Damadola. If he was indeed killed, his death should be another significant blow to the group's biological warfare efforts.
No risk of bioterrorism—success too unreliable
Keller 13 (Rebecca, 3/7/13, Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Rebecca is a science and technology analyst @ Stratfor, holds a bachelor’s degree in biochemistry from Washington University, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential, 7/16/16, SM)
The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. ∂ Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 — or any influenza virus, for that matter — is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population.∂ There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.
No cyberterrorism impact—threats exaggerated
Quigley, Burns, and Stallard 15
(Kevin, Calvin, Kristen, 3/26/15, Government Information Quarterly, “‘Cyber Gurus’: A rhetorical analysis of the language of cybersecurity specialists and the implications for security policy and critical infrastructure protection,” http://cryptome.org/2015/05/cyber-gurus.pdf, 7/16/16, SM)
While these are four prevalent types of cybersecurity issues, there is∂ evidence to suggest that the threat is exaggerated and oversimplified for∂ some. Many note the lack of empirical evidence to support the widespread∂ fear of cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare, for instance∂ (Cavelty, 2007; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009; Lewis, 2003; Rid, 2013;∂ Stohl, 2007).∂ According to Stohl (2007), there is little vulnerability in critical infrastructure∂ that could lead to violence or fatalities. Secondly, there are few∂ actors who would be interested in or capable of exploiting such vulnerabilities.∂ Thirdly, and in relation to cyber-terrorism in particular, the∂ expenses necessary to carry out cyber-attacks are greater than traditional∂ forms of terrorism, limiting the utility of cyber-attacks compared∂ to other available measures (Stohl, 2007). Instead, technology is most∂ often used by terrorists to provide information, solicit financial support,∂ network with like-minded terrorists, recruit, and gather information; in other words, “terrorist groups are simply exploiting modern tools to∂ accomplish the same goals they sought in the past” (Stohl, 2007, p. 230).
No cyberterrorism—technological complexity, not enough fear created
(Edwin, 1/13/15, InfoSec Institute, “Cyber Terrorism: Complexities and Consequences,” Edwin is a cybersecurity professional and works for Booz Allen Hamilton, http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/cyber-terrorism-complexities-consequences/, 7/17/15, SM)
While a terrorist using the Internet to bring down the critical infrastructures the United States relies on makes an outstanding Hollywood plot, there are flaws in the execution of this storyline as an actual terrorist strategy. Conway (2011) calls out three limitations on using cyber-related activities for terrorists: Technological complexity, image, and accident (Against Cyberterrorism, 2011, p. 27).∂ Each is important to consider. While critical infrastructures may make a tempting target and threat actor capabilities are certainly increasing (Nyugan, 2013), it is a complicated process to attack something of that magnitude. It is precisely the interconnectedness of these two disparate parts that make them a target, however.∂ Nyugan (2013) calls them cyber-physical systems (CPS): “A physical system monitored or controlled by computers. Such systems include, for example, electrical grids, antilock brake systems, or a network of nuclear centrifuges” (p. 1084).∂ In Verton’s (2003) imaginary narrative, the target of the Russian hackers, the SCADA system, is a CPS. However, Lewis (2002) argues the relationship between vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures (such as MAE-East) and computer network attacks is not a clear cut as first thought (p. 1). It is not simply a matter of having a computer attached to a SCADA system and thus the system is can now be turned off and society goes in a free fall of panic and explosions and mass chaos.∂ The first idea Conway (2011) posits reduces to the notion that information technology is difficult in most cases. There are reasons it takes veritable armies of engineers and analysts to make these complex systems interact and function as intended. However, there are a limited number of terrorists with the necessary computer skills to conduct a successful attack (pp. 27-28).∂ Immediately the argument turns to hiring external assistance from actual computer hackers (as most journalists and Hollywood scriptwriters do). Conway (2011) dismisses that idea, correctly, as a significant compromise of operational security (p. 28).∂ The US Department of Defense as defines operational security, or OPSEC:∂ A process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; determine indicators and vulnerabilities that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries, and determine which of these represent an unacceptable risk; then select and execute countermeasures that eliminate the risk to friendly actions and operations or reduce it to an acceptable level (US Department of Defense, 2012).∂ In the context of this paper, letting outside profit-motivated technicians into the planning and execution phase of a terrorist plot would be risky for conservative-minded individuals such a religious terrorists (Hoffman, 2006). As the number of people who are aware of a plot increases, the potential number of people who can leak operational details of the plot increases exponentially.∂ It is for this reason Verton’s (2003) scenario is most improbable.∂ The second concern Conway (2011) notes is one of audience. Recalling the definition of terrorist put forth by Hoffman (2006), terrorists need to generate publicity to achieve their goals: they need to create a climate of fear through violence or the threat of violence. Simply attacking something and having no one notice it is not an operational success for a terrorist. Terrorists need to have their grievances known (Nacos, 2000, p. 176).∂ The terrorist act needs to be witnessed, such as the planes crashing into the World Trade Center or the hostage taking in Munich. in order to generate the necessary level of discourse to affect the goals the terrorist has in mind. Unfortunately, injecting code into a DNS server or shutting down Amazon.com does not generate the required intensity of chaos modern terrorists require (Conway, Against Cyberterrorism, 2011, p. 28).∂ This leads to Conway’s (2011) third point: the accident. The United States relies heavily on computer and information systems. However, if a system goes offline in today’s world, users are just as likely to suspect a system failure or accident as anything else is (p. 28).
No cyberterrorism threat—easy to prevent, they’re using the Internet only for promotional purposes
(Graham, 10/20/14, The State of Security, “GCHQ Spokesperson Says Cyber Terrorism Is ‘Not a Concern’,” former employee of Sophos, McAfee, Dr. Solomon’s, inducted into the InfoSecurity Europe Hall of Fame, http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/gchq-spokesperson-says-cyber-terrorism-is-not-a-concern/, 7/17/15, SM)
Yes, a terrorist could launch a denial-of-service attack, or write a piece of malware, or hack into a sensitive system, just as easily as the next (non-terrorist), but there is no reason to believe that an attack launched by a terrorist living in
his secret HQ in the mountain caves of Afghanistan would be any harder to stop than the hundreds of thousands of other attacks launched each day.∂ That’s not to say that launching an Internet attack wouldn’t have attractive aspects for those behind a terror campaign. Put bluntly, it’s a heck lot easier (and less physically dangerous) to write a Trojan horse to infect a computer on the other side of the world, than to drive a lorry loaded up with Semtex outside a government building’s front door.∂ Furthermore, terrorists are often interested in making headlines, to focus the world’s attention on what they believe to be their plight. If innocent people die during a terrorist action that certainly does help you make the newspapers, but it’s very bad for public relations, and is going to make it a lot harder to convince others to sympathise with your campaign.∂ The good news about pretty much all Internet attacks, of course, is that they don’t involve the loss of life. Any damage done is unlikely to leave individuals maimed or bleeding, but can still bloody the nose of a government that should have been better protected or potentially disrupt economies.∂ But still, such terrorist-initiated Internet attacks should be no harder to protect against than the financially-motivated and hacktivist attacks that organisations defend themselves against every day.∂ So, when a journalist asks me if I think cyber terrorism is a big concern, I tend to shrug and say “Not that much” and ask them to consider why Al Qaeda, for instance, never bothered to launch a serious Internet attack in the 13 years since September 11.∂ After all, if it is something for us all to fear – why wouldn’t they have done it already?∂ So, I was pleased to have my views supported last week – from a perhaps surprising source.∂ GCHQ, the UK intelligence agency which has become no stranger to controversy following the revelations of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, appears to agree that cyber terrorism is not a concern. Or at least that’s what they’re saying behind closed doors, according to SC Magazine.∂ Part of SC Magazine story on cyber terrorism∂ The report quoted an unnamed GCHQ spokesperson at a CSARN (City Security And Resilience Networks) forum held last week in London, debunking the threat posed by cyber terrorists:∂ “Quite frankly we don’t see cyber terrorism. It hasn’t occurred…but we have to guard against it. For those of you thinking about strategic threats, terrorism is not [a concern] at this point in time,” although he added that the agency was ‘very concerned’ on a possible attack at the time of the 2012 London Olympics.∂ ∂ He said that while it is clear that terrorism groups – such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda – are technically-adept, there’s been no sign of them venturing to cyber beyond promotional purposes.∂ ∂ “For some reason, there doesn’t seem intent to use destructive cyber capability. It’s clearly a theoretical threat. We’ve not seen – and we were very worried around London Olympics – but we’ve never seen it. We’ll continue to keep an eye on it.”∂ In a time when the potential threat posed by terrorism is often used as an excuse for covert surveillance by intelligence agencies, such as GCHQ, and the UK government raising the “threat level” to “Severe” at the end of August due to conflict in Iraq and Syria, one has to wonder if the spokesperson quoted was speaking entirely “on-message.”