Greed & grievance economic Agendas in Civil Wars edited by mats Berdal David M. Malone



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GREED & GRIEVANCE

A project of the International Peace Academy

GREED & GRIEVANCE

Economic Agendas in Civil Wars

EDITED BY
Mats Berdal
David M. Malone


image

Published in the United States of America in 2000 by


Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by


Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

Paperback edition published in Canada by the


International Development Research Centre
PO Box 8500, Ottawa, Ontario, KIG 3H9 Canada
www.idrc.ca/booktique

© 2000 by the International Peace Academy, Inc.


All rights reserved by the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Greed and grievance : economic agendas in civil wars / edited by
    Mats Berdal and David M. Malone.
        p.  cm.
    Includes bibliographical references and index.
    ISBN 978-1-55587-892-4 (hardcover : alk. paper)
    ISBN 978-1-55587-868-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)
    1. Civil war—Economic aspects. 2. War—Economic aspects.
3. Profiteering. I. Berdal, Mats R., 1965– II. Malone, David M.
HB195.G72  2000
330.9—dc21                                                    99-086829

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Berdal, Mats
Greed and grievance : economic agendas in civil wars
    Includes bibliographical references and an index.
    ISBN 978-0-88936-915-3
    1. Civil war—Economic aspects. 2. War—Economic aspects.
3. Political violence—Economic aspects. 4. Social conflicts—Economic aspects. I. Malone, David, 1954– . II. International Development Research Centre (Canada). III. Title. IV. Title: Economic agendas in civil wars.
HC79.D4B47    2000          303.6'4                  C00-980099-9

British Cataloguing in Publication Data
A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America



image

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.



5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

1 Introduction
Mats Berdal and David M. Malone

1

PART 1
APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CIVIL WARS

 

2 Incentives and Disincentives for Violence
David Keen

19

3 Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars
William Reno

43

4 Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies
Mark Duffield

69

5 Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective
Paul Collier

91

6 The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?
Indra de Soysa

113

7 The View from Below
Musifiky Mwanasali

137

PART 2
CONFRONTING ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS

 

8 Arms, Elites, and Resources in the Angolan Civil War
Virginia Gamba and Richard Cornwell

157

9 Targeted Financial Sanctions
Samuel D. Porteous

173

10 Aiding or Abetting? Humanitarian Aid and Its Economic Role in Civil War
David Shearer

189

11 Shaping Agendas in Civil Wars: Can International Criminal Law Help?
Tom Farer

205

List of Acronyms

233

Selected Bibliography

235

The Contributors

239

Index

243

About the Book

251

Acknowledgments

This volume had its genesis in the conference "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars" held in Canada House, London, in April 1999. We would like to express our deep appreciation to the cosponsors of the conference: the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Centre for International Studies at Oxford University, and the International Peace Academy. The Ford Foundation and the governments of Sweden and Norway generously funded Oxford's significant contribution to the success of the conference. We would also like to extend our thanks to Michael Small for his successful efforts to coordinate the sponsorship for this event and his contribution to shaping the agenda, and to Ben Rowswell for his dedication to making the logistics a success.

We are deeply grateful to the International Development Research Centre for its financial support for the dissemination of this volume. We would also like to acknowledge the excellence, professionalism, and enthusiasm of our authors. It has been a most agreeable and enriching education for us to work with them in shaping the chapters that follow. Lucy Mair and Charlie Cater provided superb research and editorial assistance at the International Peace Academy. To them, warmest thanks. We are also grateful to our publisher, Lynne Rienner, and to her dedicated, efficient, and friendly team.

The Editors

1
Introduction

Mats Berdal and David M. Malone

The presence of economic motives and commercial agendas in wars is not so much a new phenomenon as a familiar theme in the history of warfare. In the war-ravaged and politically fragmented German lands of the Thirty Years War, war itself became a vast "private and profit-making enterprise," with Wallenstein's imperial army at one point "the greatest business enterprise of the age."1 In a later and apparently more heroic age, many of Napoleon's more celebrated marshals—Massena, Soult, and Brune—displayed as much skill in the art of private plundering and the accumulation of personal wealth as they did in the art of war. In much more recent times, as contributors to this volume show, the licensing of economically motivated violence in such places as Sierra Leone and Liberia has resembled, in terms of its functional utility, both medieval and early modern patterns of warfare. To historians and social scientists, the importance of economic factors to the understanding of any particular conflict will always be a source of dispute. Yet, the need to incorporate, at some level and in some form, the "economic dimension" in order to better understand the causes and the persistence of conflict is uncontroversial.

In spite of this, in the recent literature on conflict and, even more so, in the practice of international and nongovernmental organizations, comparatively little systematic attention has been given to the precise role of economically motivated actions and processes in generating and sustaining contemporary civil conflicts. This volume is intended to improve our understanding in this area. Specifically, it explores how economic considerations often shape the calculations and behavior of the parties to a conflict, giving rise to a particular war economy and a distinctive dynamic of conflict. As several of the contributors note, the nature of these war economies challenge many of the core assumptions that have informed thinking and guided policy with respect to civil wars and internal conflict in the 1990s. Indeed, in some of the cases examined, what is usually considered to be the most basic of military objectives in war—that is, defeating the enemy in battle—has been replaced by economically driven interests in continued fighting and the institutionalization of violence at what is for some clearly a profitable level of intensity. The extent to which the economic agendas of belligerents actually shape the course of a conflict undoubtedly varies from case to case. Yet, even where military and political objectives appear to provide the obvious rationale for fighting, conflicts are still likely to be influenced by economic motives and opportunities, especially at the local level. Moreover, as David Keen notes in Chapter 2, the experiences of the 1990s show that civil wars are not static but have often "mutated into wars where immediate agendas assume an increasingly important role." These agendas, in turn, may "significantly prolong civil wars: Not only do they constitute a vested interest in continued conflict, they also tend to create widespread destitution, which itself may feed into economically motivated violence."

It is this complex web of motives and interactions that allows us to speak of the political economy of civil wars. In one sense, of course, to speak of "civil wars" is misleading since, as Charles King has noted elsewhere, such wars are never entirely internal in character.2 Indeed, a recurring theme in this book is that the persistence of conflict and, in particular, the crystallization of war economies within "weak" states can only be understood within a broader global context. A narrow state-centric approach to assessing these conflicts is, therefore, both of limited analytical value and policy relevance. Yet, the notion of "civil war," though imprecise in certain respects, remains justified in the sense that the wars considered here do differ sharply from "classic" interstate conflict, do take place predominantly within "weak" states, and do all impact very directly on the civilian population and society at large.

Although this volume does not aim to provide any kind of consensus on the variety of issues and cases it covers (let alone add up to a claim that contemporary civil wars can all be reduced to "economic" explanations), contributors and participants at the London conference agreed upon the importance of the subject. In particular, they focused on the need to address critically the three overall aims of the conference:

imageto improve our understanding of the political economy of civil wars through a focused analysis of the economic agendas of competing factions in civil wars.

imageto examine how "globalization" creates new opportunities for the elites of competing factions to pursue their economic agendas through trade, investment, and migration ties, both legal and illegal, to neighboring states and to more distant, industrialized economies.

imageto examine the possible policy responses available to external actors, including governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector firms, to shift the economic agendas of elites in civil wars from war toward peace.

These aims also provide the background to these chapters, and each of them therefore merits some further comment.



Economic Agendas and the Study of Civil Wars

Much of the writing and policy debate relating to civil wars in the 1990s has tended, not unreasonably, to emphasize the costs of conflict. The staggering number of deaths and the widespread destruction associated with these wars have naturally reinforced a tendency to view them as an unmitigated calamity for all concerned. In this view, the outbreak of war and its persistence represent the breakdown of "normal" or "peacetime" patterns of social, economic, and political intercourse within society. It is a view that rests on a conception of "peace" and "war" as separate and distinct categories, a dichotomy that has a long tradition in Western thinking about war.

This dichotomy is also implicit in what Mark Duffield identifies in Chapter 4 as three of the more influential, partly competing approaches to the study of the causes and persistence of civil wars in the 1990s. The first of these, often found in reports by NGOs and UN agencies, tends to view conflict and wars as a temporary "interruption" to an ongoing process of development; conflict is seen as a form of "developmental malaise." A second approach, associated primarily with peace and conflict studies, has emphasized the role played by misperceptions and failures of "communications" in explaining the incidence and persistence of civil conflict. The third approach, which has received the greatest amount of popular attention (as well as most of the academic criticism), has focused on the supposed reemergence, in heightened and more virulent forms, of "ancient hatreds" and long-suppressed animosities. In all these cases, the resort to violence and the initiation of war are seen as signaling the collapse of a process or a particular order and are, for this very reason, both "irrational" and dysfunctional.

As the empirical evidence presented in this book shows, however, to view civil wars as no more than costly disruptions from "normal peacetime" conditions conceals the degree to which organized violence, especially within politically fragmented and economically weak states, may also serve a range of different purposes. The fact is that much of the violence with which bodies such as the UN have been concerned in the post–Cold War era has been driven not by a Clausewitzian logic of forwarding a set of political aims, but rather by powerful economic motives and agendas. Indeed, important and stimulating statistical investigations by Paul Collier, which are presented in Chapter 5 and cover much of the Cold War period, suggest that economic agendas are "central to understanding why civil wars get going" and shed considerable light on factors predisposing countries to internal conflicts. In some cases, as William Reno argues in Chapter 3 with reference to the ongoing conflict in Central Africa, warfare is better understood as "an instrument of enterprise and violence as a mode of accumulation." In such circumstances, the continuation of war represents not so much the collapse of one system as the emergence of a new one; one that benefits certain groups—government officials, traders, combatants, and international actors who stand to gain from dealing with local actors—while further impoverishing other sections of the community. Evidence of this can be found in a number of the wars that have raged in the 1990s, and some of the more striking examples of the "benefits of war" have, by now, become fairly well documented. Others are explored and documented more fully in this volume.



In Liberia, Charles Taylor is estimated to have made more than U.S.$400 million per year from the war in the years between 1992 and 1996. In Chapter 7, Musifiky Mwanasali points out how the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has enabled neighboring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda to become major exporters of raw materials, including gold or cobalt, which they do not naturally possess. He notes how "timber, palm oil, coffee, elephant tusks, and precious minerals," which have been looted from the former Zaire and exported through the black market, "have now become a main source of foreign exchange for Zaire's resource-deprived neighbors." In Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has since 1992 controlled some 70 percent of the country's diamond production, which has allowed it to continue the war while creating the conditions for local traders, middlemen, and regional commanders to accumulate considerable fortunes. On the government side, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) "business elite" has also benefited from Angola's war economy by selectively granting attractive foreign exchange and import licenses, as well as by the selling of weapons to UNITA (see Chapter 8). This kind of collusion between supposedly opposing parties is certainly not unique to the case of Angola. Between 1993 and 1997, many Khmer Rouge commanders, Cambodian government officials, and Thai army officers were more concerned about enriching themselves through illegal logging activity and trading in gems than they were about bringing war to an end. Stephen Ellis, in his carefully researched study of the Liberian civil war between 1989 and mid-1997, observes that "as far as possible, factions avoided fighting other armed groups," and that "simulated attacks, designed solely to facilitate looting, were a common tactic, particularly in front line areas where tensions ran high."3 Likewise, during the brutal war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, unlikely alliances emerged on the ground that were not exclusively motivated by the desire to defeat the main enemy. At certain critical moments during the war in Bosnia, the war effort of the Bosnian Serb Army was heavily dependent on the supply of fuel from Croat forces. The willingness to provide this fuel, a practice that continued after the signing of the Federation agreement between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in early 1994, not only served to prolong the war but also offered rich earnings for "petrol barons" and various middlemen throughout the war zone.4 In many of these cases, the benefits of war are closely linked to the presence of and access to natural resources in the area of conflict. The precise relationship between mineral wealth and conflict is explored more fully in this volume by Indra de Soysa (Chapter 6), who using quantitative analysis argues that "an abundance of mineral wealth is positively and significantly related to armed conflict."

In addition to the economic opportunities generated by war itself, the growing involvement of international agencies in efforts to contain and alleviate the worst effects of civil conflict has created another set of economic opportunities for local actors. As David Shearer shows in Chapter 10, relief aid made available during conflicts in order to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of fighting has often been diverted, stolen, and taxed by warring parties (Shearer is careful, however, to add that the degree to which aid has actually prolonged conflict and fueled further violence is probably exaggerated.)

The wider point here should be obvious: Understanding the sources of violence requires an understanding of "the economics underpinning it." As David Keen has noted elsewhere:

Conflict can create war economies, often in the regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members of armed gangs can benefit from looting; and regimes can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances, ending civil wars becomes difficult. Winning may not be desirable: the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes.5



"Globalization" and Modern War Economies

It was argued at the outset that the attempt to benefit materially from war, through looting or other forms of violent accumulation, is hardly a new phenomenon. Some scholars, also rejecting any claim to novelty, have suggested that many civil wars are best understood as the inescapable phase of ongoing processes of "state building." In this view, similar processes have long since been completed in places such as Western Europe but were delayed, partly by the effects of the Cold War, in much of the developing world. In the words of Mohammed Ayoob, "state making and what we now call 'internal war' are two sides of the same coin."6 The extent to which there is, in fact, anything fundamentally new about the kinds of war economies described above is another central theme of this book. It is a theme discussed under the rather ill-defined, overused notion of "globalization."

The term globalization is notoriously imprecise and as such it is undoubtedly, as Jean Marie Guehenno suggests, a "symptom of the conceptual uncertainties of our time."7 Yet, as Andrew Hurrell has also noted, the term "has become a very powerful metaphor for the sense that a number of universal processes are at work generating increased interconnection and interdependence between states and between societies."8 Arguably the most influential, essentially liberal, and largely optimistic view of globalization has tended to stress the "integrating and homogenising influence of market forces" and the conflict-mitigating potential inherent in the "increased flows of values, knowledge and ideas" across borders.9 In the long run, it is argued, the cumulative impact of these processes will be to weaken exclusive loyalties and to hasten the emergence of a "world society."

In the present book, globalization refers primarily to the transformations taking place within the international economic and financial system. In this more limited sense, globalization refers to the increasing ease with which capital and services now flow within the world economy, a process initially encouraged by financial deregulation and now continuously stimulated by rapid technological change. This in turn has aided other related forms of economic globalization, notably the "internationalization of production" as reflected in the growth of foreign direct investment and the increasingly important role for transnational corporations in the world economy. In this more restricted view of globalization, some of the evidence presented in the book points to a more complex relationship between globalizing trends in the world economy and violent conflicts in areas and within states at the margin of that economy. The findings would, at the very least, qualify the more optimistic readings of the effects of globalization alluded to above and that have been influential in much of the Western thinking about international affairs after the Cold War.

William Reno, building on his earlier and important work on African conflicts, argues in Chapter 3 that "internal warfare in some very weak states represents neither dissolution of political order itself nor the initiation of state building projects with parallels to the process as it occurred in early modern Europe." He instead seeks to explain internal warfare in terms of "economic motivations that are specifically related to the intensification of transnational commerce in recent decades and to the political economy of violence inside a particular category of states." Other contributors also emphasize that modern war economies are "rarely self-sufficient or autarkic" and that though warring parties and political actors may control local assets, they remain heavily dependent on external support and supplies. In particular, as Mark Duffield writes in Chapter 4, the "marketing of local resources and procurement of arms and supplies" rely on relatively easy access to global networks and markets. To the extent that such access has become easier it has also increased the prospects for local elites to benefit economically from continued violence and conflict. This in turn has adversely affected the balance of incentives in favor of peace and provides part of the explanation for the seemingly intractable nature of many contemporary conflicts. In short, it is the highly "transnational and networked characteristics" of modern war economies that allows us to talk of a fundamentally new context in which to study and approach civil wars.

Support for this argument can be found in several of the specific cases referred to above: Members of the Cambodian government, Khmer Rouge, and the Thai military encountered few difficulties exporting gems and high-grade tropical timber, and in Sierra Leone the sale of diamonds and gold on the world market has kept the war going and generated wealth for officials, commanders, and various international companies and businesses. In Liberia, as Ellis has shown, from the "beginning to the end of the war, each Liberian warlord of any substance had alliances with foreign businessmen and at least one foreign government."10 Virginia Gamba and Richard Cornwell in Chapter 8 provide perhaps the most detailed example of the sinister linkages between the war economy inside one country, Angola, and the global economy. In particular, they show how UNITA, once heavily reliant on Cold War patronage, has been able not only to survive but to become a more resilient and formidable military force through its diamond trade (now apparently channeled through South Africa, Belgium, and Israel) as well as by building up a "substantial investment portfolio abroad to supplement" revenues from diamond trading.



Policy Implications for Governments and International Organizations

The insights gained into the economics underpinning contemporary civil wars are clearly of more than academic interest. There is now much evidence to suggest that the failure to account for the presence of economic agendas in conflicts has, at times, seriously undermined international efforts to consolidate fragile peace agreements. In particular, the tendency among donors and within international organizations to treat "conflict" and "postconflict" as separate categories and distinct phases in a quest for "lasting peace" has carried with it the expectation (and planning assumption) that the formal end of armed hostilities also marks a definitive break with past patterns of violence. In fact, and as this book amply confirms, even in the best of circumstances this is rarely the case. Grievances and conflicts of interest usually persist after the end of hostilities and, in turn, affect the "peace building" activities initiated and sponsored by international organizations, NGOs, and donor countries. As an earlier study into the impact of economic agendas on some of these activities suggested, "Transitions from war to peace . . . are more usefully seen as involving a realignment of political interests and a readjustment of economic strategies rather than a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production, or from repression to democracy."11

It would, of course, be deeply misleading to suggest that all of those concerned with making and implementing policy in this area have been entirely unaware of the economic dimensions of the conflicts with which they have been dealing. Yet, there is a deeper problem faced by policymakers and intergovernmental bodies attempting to address civil wars, and it is one that is brought into stark relief when the focus of inquiry is shifted to the kind of economically motivated substate violence examined in this book. The problem arises out of the state-centric framework within which donor countries and international organizations, especially the UN and its agencies, necessarily operate. This framework has clearly not prevented donors and organizations from engaging in civil war–type situations, but it has placed constraints both on the manner of their involvement and the official debate about the nature and challenges of operating in such complex environments. At the London conference where the contributions to this volume were first presented, participants from the policymaking community stressed the difficulty of addressing phenomena such as "shadow states," warlordism, and substate violence within existing institutional and policy frameworks. The limitations of the state-centric framework that such observations reflect should not tempt us to embrace glib and empirically unsustainable assertions about the "withering away of the state" and "end of sovereignty." Yet, as indicated above, a narrow state-centric approach—one that focuses on formal state structures alone, ignores the realities of "factual sovereignty," and underestimates the degree to which transnational and other processes have in many places eroded the substantive content of statehood—is certain to provide a very incomplete picture of the dynamics that sustain civil wars.

There is a further reason, however, why the kinds of issues examined in this book have been difficult to address within existing institutional settings, and it is particularly evident in the case of the UN and its agencies. The fact is that a number of countries, especially those in the developing world, continue to view with suspicion "Western" debates about the need to "move beyond sovereignty." To many countries, notably India and China, there is still a very real tension between the activism of the UN with regard to internal conflicts in the 1990s and the cardinal principle of international society: the sovereign equality of states and its corollary that there is a duty of nonintervention by states in the internal affairs of other states.12

It is against this background that the real value of the research findings collected and presented in this book should be seen. A better understanding of the political economy of civil wars, the subject of Part 1, is contained within the wider challenge of how best to ensure that the international community can effectively assist transitions from protracted conflict to more durable peace. How the international community goes about providing that assistance—how it deals with the challenge of criminal and economically motivated violence in civil wars—is examined in Part 2. In addition to evaluating the role of policy instruments such as financial sanctions and international legal instruments (as done by Samuel Porteous and Tom Farer, respectively), the section considers some of the dilemmas faced by those charged with implementing aid policy in civil-war settings (examined by David Shearer).

Though the range of issues covered is wide, this book should properly be seen as introducing a subject that deserves further attention from both academic analysts and policymakers. As such, the book and the London conference have provided some useful directions for future research.



The Future Research Agenda

Several dogs either did not bark or merely whimpered at the London conference, in spite of strenuous efforts by those designing the meeting to stimulate discussion on the broadest possible range of topics in the general subject area.

Although the role of the private sector in shaping and furthering economic agendas in civil wars was widely accepted as key, only local trading networks were addressed in any depth. The interaction between shadow states and international corporations was discussed, but little light was shed on the motivations and strategies of these companies. Nevertheless, in seeking to come to grips with means for international actors to influence belligerents, the corporate factor looms large in the equation. Preexisting and entirely legitimate operations of international companies are often engulfed by civil war, forcing on them strategies of survival they do not necessarily welcome. Both the risks and the opportunities they face on the fluid terrain of civil wars for them doubtless shape their strategies. These strategies and their relative weight within overall corporate life need to be better understood.

Parallel to the legitimate and well-established international private sector exist criminal networks ideally placed to interact with belligerents in civil wars. Narcotics trafficking is but the most obvious source of rapid personal enrichment and of funding for weapons, munitions, and other supplies to keep war efforts running. However, the relationship between belligerents and large international crime networks is not well enough understood for points of vulnerability to be readily identified and exploited by international actors seeking to cut off such commerce.

Belligerents in civil wars have long been reputed to stash abroad large sums of money skimmed from their war chests. The fruits of wider corruption have notoriously enriched many national leaders and their immediate supporters. Not only have international actors (the international financial institutions [IFIs], commercial banks often benefiting handsomely from the corresponding deposits, and donor governments) done little to counteract this syndrome, they have never been consistent, coddling favored tyrants while criticizing others, and have not, to date, favored a systemic attack on this scourge. Nevertheless, a regime (either established by treaty or under administrative arrangements agreed on at a high level) designed systematically to combat this noxious form of white-collar crime is urgently needed. With the Statute of an International Criminal Court agreed on in Rome in 1998, should parallel arrangements be far behind to address the financial rape and ruination of whole countries, often those at war?

Finally, the conference fell short on one of its stated goals—to identify incentives and disincentives that could help turn parties to (and potential belligerents in) civil strife from war to peace. Some of the incentives required relate to the gaps identified immediately above. However, attention is required more broadly on the policy tools for international actors in this area.



The research community is beginning to turn its attention more systematically to this subject area, and several recent volumes have explored aspects of it.13 The discussions at London suggested several clusters of issues for further policy-relevant research not yet fully addressed by others:

imageThe role of the international private sector, particularly that of extractive industries (petroleum, mining), is key. Whereas leading firms have mostly adopted a studiously "neutral" stance on civil strife, disclaiming any political agenda at all, their actions on the ground and in global markets inevitably tend to favor some parties over others. The situation of Shell Oil Company in southeastern Nigeria and De Beers vis-à-vis Angola makes this clear. For research on this topic to make headway, it would be necessary to engage meaningfully with a range of international firms, inter alia in the extractive and service (e.g., banking) fields, to establish how they view their own roles in civil war situations and what factors might influence them to support actively the settlement of civil wars. This would be a delicate undertaking and would probably require more discretion and off-the-record exchange than would normally be desirable in research activities.

imageThe absence of an international legal regime to deal with "white collar crime" taking advantage of the disruptions created by civil unrest and strife can be construed as a strong incentive for parasitic elite economic agendas. A major issue raised during the London conference was the need to distinguish between money sheltered internationally for tax reasons and caches of money secluded from detection because of its reprehensible origins. The recent relaxation of bank secrecy in Switzerland and a greater disposition there (and in some other financial centers) to freeze such accounts obscure the issue of whether governments in the industrialized world are prepared to take a lead on stigmatizing and sequestering ill-gotten gains not narrowly tied to the narcotics trade and other abhorrent forms of trafficking by leaders and their followers in conflict situations. The negotiation of an international agreement on the subject seems far off but need not be viewed as utopian. (Talk of an international criminal court seemed utopian only a very few years ago.)

imageThough economic activities at the local level that are illegal under international agreements and domestic law will inevitably occur in the struggle for survival that attends most civil wars (and may not warrant much international concern), funding for war efforts based on large-scale criminal activity deserves further attention. For example, the activities of Arkan and other Balkan warlords are widely reported to have been largely directed toward (and otherwise funded by) drug trafficking. The impact of such predatory warlords on civil wars is so overwhelmingly negative that the international community should better equip itself to combat their fund-raising activities. Building on existing norms and agreements, such efforts should focus on practical measures to combat large-scale and high-level criminality of this type.

imageIncentives and disincentives for peace available to international actors attempting to influence economic agendas in civil wars fall into several categories: the coercive (e.g., UN Security Council–mandated sanctions, intergovernmental agreements on money-laundering, etc.); the exemplary (often focusing on basic human needs of civilian populations, such as food and health, e.g., corridors of peace negotiated for specific purposes); the financial (multilateral and bilateral assistance and potential funding from certain key private-sector actors); and the rhetorical. Little comprehensive work has been done to catalogue and assess what these measures are and how effective they have proved in the past. In particular, are efforts aimed at addressing basic human needs in countries afflicted by civil strife effective in shaming or inspiring leaders to better care for those dependent on them, or do they merely in practice serve to absolve them from their responsibilities to local populations? Here, regional differences may be significant.

Several of the authors of ensuing chapters have argued, directly or indirectly, that in a world awash with weapons—many of them produced in countries with few other viable exports—the best means of choking off arms supplies to belligerents is to turn off the financial spigot. This volume illustrates how difficult this will be. Policy instruments could certainly be crafted to do so, but this prospect seems still distant, because knowledge is as yet scant, the motivations of key international actors conflict, the governments of major powers have often displayed a mercantilist bent even where conflict threatens or rages, and, there is understandable although excessive reluctance by leading governments to focus on the role of multinational companies in the drama.14 Further research may encourage governments and others to act sooner rather than later. We hope that this volume may represent a modest step in this direction.



Notes

1. M. S. Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618–1789 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 48.

2. Charles King, "Ending Civil Wars," Adelphi Paper 308 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997).

3. Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy (London: Hurst and Company, 1999), 145.

4. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, pp. 247–255 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

5. David Keen, "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars," Adelphi Paper 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).

6. Mohammed Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World," in Stephanie Neuman (ed.), International Relations Theory and the Third World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 42.

7. Jean-Marie Guehenno, "Globalisation and Its Impact on International Strategy," paper presented at the Fortieth IISS Annual Conference, Oxford, September 1998, 1.

8. Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics," Review of International Studies, 21, no. 4 (1995): 345. For a sophisticated discussion of the liberal view of globalization see also Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, "Globalisation and Inequality," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24, no. 3 (1995): 447–470.

9. Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism," 345.

10. Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, 164.

11. For an attempt to substantiate this assertion with respect to two particular areas of external support—the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants after conflict, and the restructuring of the "security sector," see Mats Berdal and David Keen, "Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 26, no. 3 (1997).

12. The debate sparked at the UN following Kofi Annan's advocacy, in a September 1999 speech to the General Assembly of greater international willingness to intervene in support of humanitarian goals, demonstrates how lively and serious the issue remains.

13. For example, see Jackie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), Peace, Profit or Plunder: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies (Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies, 1999); and R. T. Naylor, Patriots & Profiteers: On Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting and State-Sponsored Crime (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999).

14. Recent action by Canada somewhat breaks the mold. Its permanent representative to the UN, Robert Fowler, who chairs the UN Security Council's Angola sanctions committee, in May 1999 traveled to Africa and other venues relevant to the diamond trade in order to engage with those active in this trade and encourage better compliance with the sanctions regime against UNITA. Academic and NGO research played a significant role in influencing Canadian thinking on sanctions. On Angola, a cautious but damning study, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angola Conflict, produced by Global Witness (a London-based NGO) in 1999, was particularly useful.

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